CTC

TRENDS

National Training Center (NTC)

1QFY97 & 2QFY97

NATIONAL TRAINING CENTER TRENDS, 1ST AND 2ND QUARTERS, FY 97

The CALL Lessons Learned Division, CTC Branch, collects these trends from the respective Observer/Controller (OC) teams and compiles the results. Organized by the Battlefield Operating System (BOS), the trends reflect both *Positive Performance* and *Needs Emphasis* based on quarterly assessment.

Each of the trends is annotated according to Final Draft, TRADOC Pam 11-9, *Blueprint of the Battlefield*, dated 10 September 1993. **The trends are numbered sequentially for ease of reference, and are not in any priority order**. A statement of the problem or positive performance is provided with supporting observations and suggested TTPs.

NOTES:

1. The 10 September 1993 version of TRADOC Pam 11-9 updated the TA.5 Intelligence BOS: TA.5.1, *Develop Tactical Intelligence Requirements*. The addition of the new TA.5.1 resulted in an incremental increase in the **second** digit of all the subsequent numbers in the Intelligence BOS.

EXAMPLES:

   - The old TA.5.1.2, *Collect Target Information*
       is now TA.5.**2**.2, *Collect Target Information*

   - The old TA.5.3.1, *Prepare Reports on Target Development*
       is now TA.5.**4**.1, *Prepare Reports on Target Development*

Beginning with all FY 96 CTC Trends publications, the Intelligence BOS numbering follows the new BOS numbers. Keep this numbering system in mind as an audit trail when reviewing CTC Trends published prior to FY96.

2. OCs covering various BOS sometimes submit very similar trends. If a listed trend is followed by this annotation (+), then that trend was duplicated and the narrative will be a composite of the two original narratives. In each case, if the OCs mention a relevant **technique** or **procedure**, it will be included in the narrative.

EXAMPLE:

TREND 6:   Logistics units' defensive operations (++) *(TA.6.3.1.1.3)*

In this example, the trend listed under the Mobility/Survivability BOS, code number 6.3.1.1.3, was documented two times (++).

TABLE OF CONTENTS
(NOTE: Trends are numbered sequentially for ease of reference, and are not in any priority order.)

INTELLIGENCE BOS (TA.5)

MANEUVER BOS (TA.1)

Needs Emphasis

TREND 1: Engineer force understanding of maneuver *(TA.1)*

TREND 2: Movement formations and techniques *(TA.1.1)*

TREND 3: Task Force use of dismounted infantry in scheme of maneuver *(TA.1.1.1)*

TREND 4: Brigade Support Area (BSA) Target Reference Points **(TA.1.2.1)**

TREND 5: Actions on contact *(TA.1.2.2)*

FIRE SUPPORT BOS (TA.2)

Needs Emphasis

TREND 1: Clearance of Fires **(TA. 2.1.1)**

TREND 2: Registration of Brigade Support Area (BSA) targets into TACFIRE *(TA.2.1.1)*

TREND 3: Combat Observation Lasing Team (COLT) use of Ground/Vehicle Laser Locator Designators (G/VLLDs) *(TA.2.2.1.2)*

AIR DEFENSE BOS (TA.3)

Needs Emphasis

TREND 1: Programming IFF (Interrogation Friend or Foe) for Avenger *(TA.3.1)*

TREND 2: Directed Early Warning (Air Defense) *(TA. 3.1.1)*

TREND 3: Bradley Stinger Fighting Vehicle (BSFV) platoon receipt of early warning *(TA.3.1.1)*

MOBILITY/SURVIVABILITY BOS &
NUCLEAR/BIOLOGICAL/CHEMICAL (NBC) (TA.6)

Needs Emphasis

TREND 1: Nuclear/Biological/Chemical (NBC) Operations *(TA.6.3)*

TREND 2: Control of marked contaminated areas *(TA.6.3.1)*

TREND 3: Electronic Warfare (EW) team survivability *(TA.6.3.1.1)*

TREND 4: Medical company's role in defense of the brigade support area (BSA) (++) *(TA.6.3.1.1)*

TREND 5: Bradley Stinger Fighting Vehicle (BSFV) squad preparation of fighting positions
  (TA.6.3.1.1)

TREND 6:   Logistics units' defensive operations (++) *(TA.6.3.1.1.3)*

TREND 7: Employment of the M8A1 Alarm *(TA.6.3.1.1.4)*

TREND 8: Medical company use of M8A1 Alarms *(TA.6.3.1.1.4)*

TREND 9: Search and destroy enemy reconnaissance forces *(TA.6.3.4)*

TREND 10: Security Operations *(TA. 6.3.4)*

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT BOS (TA.7)

Positive Performance

TREND 1: Military Police (MP) knowledge of weapons capabilities and maintenance *(TA.7.4.5)*

Needs Emphasis

TREND 1: Resupply of argon for the Avenger weapons system *(TA.7.3.2)*

TREND 2: Task force preparation of the maintenance estimate *(TA.7.3.2)*

TREND 3: Task force maintenance platoon task organization *(TA.7.3.2)*

TREND 4: Task force control of unit maintenance collection point (UMCP) traffic *(TA.7.3.2)*

TREND 5: Preventive Maintenance Checks and Services (PMCS) (++) *(TA.7.3.2.1)*

TREND 6: Evacuation of disabled equipment *(TA.7.3.2.2)*

TREND 7: Use of Simplified Test Equipment (STE) and Break-out Boxes (BOB) *(TA.7.3.2.3)*

TREND 8: Employment of the chaplain assistant *(TA.7.4.3.4)*

TREND 9: Deployment of the medical company in the Brigade Support Area (BSA) *(TA.7.4.4)*

TREND 10: Medical company management of maintenance and supplies *(TA.7.4.4)*

TREND 11: Training of Brigade Support Area quick-reaction forces (QRF) *(TA.7.4.5)*

TREND 12: Uploading ammunition to a Class V Facility *(TA.7.5.1.1)*

TREND 13: Ammunition Transfer Point (ATP) *(TA.7.5.1.2)*

TREND 14: MI Company sustainment and support *(TA.7.5.2)*

TREND 15: Management of Class IV and V barrier material *(TA.7.5.2)*

TREND 16: Field Artillery battalion management of Rearm, Refuel, Resupply, and Survey Point (R3SP) operations *(TA.7.5.2)*

TREND 17: Chemical Defense Equipment (CDE) requisitioning and tracking *(TA.7.5.2.1)*

TREND 18: Ammunition Support Operations *(TA.7.5.2.5)*

TREND 19:   Forward Support Battalion (FSB) coordination of refueling operations *(TA.7.5.2.8)*

TREND 20: Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) and refugee control operations *(TA.7.7.1)*

COMMAND AND CONTROL BOS (TA.4)

Positive Performance

TREND 1: Understanding of brigade CSS standard operating procedures (SOPs) *(TA.4.1.1)*

TREND 2: Electronic Attack mission planning and execution *(TA.4.5)*

Needs Emphasis

TREND 1: Transcription and Analysis (TA) team battle tracking *(TA.4.1.3)*

TREND 2: Maintain information on friendly unit locations *(TA.4.1.3)*

TREND 3: Brigade command post (CP) battle tracking *(TA.4.1.3)*

TREND 4: Battle Command *(TA. 4.1.3)*

TREND 5: Medical company command post (CP) battle tracking *(TA.4.1.3)*

TREND 6: Fire support battle tracking and situation awareness to reduce fratricide risk *(TA.4.2.1)*

TREND 7: Planning for Class IV barrier material *(TA.4.2.2)*

TREND 8: Contingency planning for advancing through templated persistent chemical (PCHEM) *(TA.4.2.3)*

TREND 9:   Engineer force development of decision points for changing situations *(TA.4.2.3)*

TREND 10: Predictive analysis *(TA.4.2.3)*

TREND 11: Brigade planning for multiple enemy courses of action (COAs) *(TA.4.3)*

TREND 12: Integration of target analysis into the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP) *(TA.4.3)*

TREND 13: Brigade planning for Combat Observation Lasing Team (COLT) operations *(TA.4.3)*

TREND 14: Decontamination planning at Task Force level *(TA.4.3)*

TREND 15: Brigade XO roles and responsibilities in the brigade battle staff *(TA.4.3)*

TREND 16: Task force S2 completion of products for the decision-making process *(TA.4.3)*

TREND 17: Engineer Integration in the Tactical Operations Center (TOC) *(TA. 4.3)*

TREND 18: Command Post Site Location and Displacement *(TA. 4.3)*

TREND 19: Combat Health Support (CHS) planning (+++) *(TA.4.3)*

TREND 20: Forward Support Battalion (FSB) Executive Officer (XO) understanding of the
Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP) *(TA.4.3)*

TREND 21: Infantry team direct fire planning *(TA.4.3)*

TREND 22: Integration of mission analysis *(TA.4.3)*

TREND 23: Developing the Commander's intent *(TA. 4.3.1)*

TREND 24: Task force development and refinement of courses of action (COA) *(TA.4.3.2)*

TREND 25: Task Force S3 understanding of course of action (COA) development *(TA.4.3.2)*

TREND 26: Wargaming the CSS concept of support *(TA.4.3.3)*

TREND 27: Wargaming *(TA.4.3.3)*

TREND 28: Tactical maneuver decision point development *(TA.4.3.3)*

TREND 29: Main Command Post standard operating procedures (SOP) for movement *(TA.4.4)*

TREND 30: Engineer battalion command and control *(TA.4.4)*

TREND 31: Defining the role of the Field Artillery battalion liaison officer (LNO) *(TA.4.4)*

TREND 32: Medical company troop leading procedures *(TA.4.4)*

TREND 33: Medical company Tactical Standard Operating Procedures (TACSOP) *(TA.4.4)*

TREND 34: CSS Company commander support of the reconnaissance and surveillance
(R&S) plan *(TA.4.4)*

TREND 35: Control of engineer operations in the Forward Support Battalion *(TA.4.4)*

TREND 36: Battalion maintenance officer (BMO) troop leading procedures *(TA.4.4)*

TREND 37: Management of Timelines *(TA. 4.4.1)*

TREND 38: Automask Criteria *(TA. 4.4.1)*

TREND 39: Graphic control measures in brigade schemes of maneuver *(TA.4.4.1.1)*

TREND 40: NBC rehearsals *(TA.4.4.1.1)*

TREND 41: Military Police (MP) rehearsals *(TA.4.4.1.1)*

TREND 42: Brigade Support Area (BSA) fire and maneuver controls *(TA.4.4.1.1)*

TREND 43: BSA save plan rehearsals *(TA.4.4.1.1)*

TREND 44: Fire Support Officer (FSO) assignment of task and purpose to targets *(TA.4.4.1.1)*

TREND 45: Coordination of religious support *(TA.4.4.1.2)*

TREND 46: Religious Support coordination with casualty evacuation planners *(TA.4.4.1.2)*

TREND 47: Location of the Brigade Support Area (BSA) commander *(TA.4.4.3)*

TREND 48: Understanding NTC Rules of Engagement (ROE) *(TA.4.4.4)*

TREND 49: Convoy actions at the halt *(TA.4.4.4)*

TREND 50: Control of Brigade Support Area (BSA) traffic flow *(TA.4.4.4)*

TREND 51: Company fire support team Pre-Combat Checks (PCCs) and Pre-Combat Inspections (PCIs) *(TA.4.4.4)*

TREND 52: Synchronization of ADA with Brigade Combat Team tactical operations *(TA.4.4.5)*

TREND 53: Synchronization of mechanized, artillery and potted smoke *(TA.4.4.5)*

TREND 54: Integration of combat service support operations *(TA.4.4.5)*

TREND 55: Breach Tenets in Mission Analysis and Course of Action Development *(TA. 4.4.5)*

TREND 56: Synchronization of refueling operations in the brigade support area (BSA) *(TA.4.4.5)*

NTC TRENDS, 1st & 2nd Qtrs, FY97

Organized by BOS, these are the trends submitted by NTC OCs for 1st and 2nd quarters, FY97. As appropriate and/or available, they provide doctrinal references and techniques and procedures for the needed training emphasis. Each trend is annotated with *Blueprint of the Battlefield* codes for use in long-term trend analysis.

INTELLIGENCE BOS

(Trends are numbered sequentially for cross-reference and are <u>not</u> in any priority order.)

Positive Performance

TREND 1: Task Force (TF) S-2 terrain analysis. TF S2s now better articulate *how the terrain will impact on the threat's available courses of action (COAs) and assist the commander and staff in determining friendly COAs that exploit opportunities the terrain provides.*

Techniques:
1. For terrain analysis, use accurate Modified Combined Obstacles Overlay (MCOO) for more accurate depictions of enemy avenues of approach into sectors/zones.
2. Use the MCOO for improved identification of:
- enemy kill sacks
- potential friendly engagements areas
- defensible terrain- specific potential system and equipment locations
3. Use TERRA BASE products and 1:25000 scale maps.
4. Coordinate routinely with supporting elements such as engineers.

(*TA. 5.3.2.3 Develop Impacts*)

TREND 2: Transcription and Analysis (TA) team graphic intelligence summary overlays. TA teams are producing periodic graphic intelligence summary overlays from intelligence obtained through radio intercept and direction finding analysis. These overlays are valuable tools for the Brigade S2 in support of the Reconnaissance and Security fight, and to confirm or deny the SITEMP. The best examples of these overlays have included detailed information on enemy reconnaissance vehicles and routes, and enemy defensive dispositions. Most significant is that these overlays consolidate a great deal of information into a succinct, easy to interpret report, for an already busy brigade S2.

Techniques:
1. The requirement to produce these overlays should be included in unit SOPs.
2. The TA team should produce these overlays every 12 hours during continuous operations and they should be cumulative in nature.
3. They should produce a finalized overlay on enemy defenses and get it to the S2 at least eight hours before LD.
4. The R&S overlay should include recon routes, if possible.
5. All overlays should include as much analyzed intelligence as possible either in graphic or attached narrative form.

(*TA.5.4 Prepare and Disseminate Intelligence Reports*)

Needs Emphasis

TREND 1: S2 section organization. S2 Sections do not work efficiently, or as a team, particularly when they transition from planning to current operations.

PROBLEMS:
1. S2 Sections often operate on a 12 on, 12 off shift schedule. Based on the time available and the work required to be done, this is a waste of precious personnel resources.
2. The shift schedule reinforces the "I'm not on shift" attitude, and tends to inhibit teamwork, setting up a "we/they" relationship between the two shifts.
3. Most S2 sections set up an internal plans section (which is a good idea), but fail to fully brief the plan to the rest of the section working current operations.

Procedures:
1. Phase soldiers into work schedules, rather than have massive turnover twice a day.
2. Rigorously enforce quality shift change briefings.
3. Hold regular "huddles", in which the entire section, together with the ACT, is brought together to share the current enemy situation, and the status of reconnaissance operations.
4. Avoid the 12 on, 12 off shift schedule. Soldiers should get at least six hours of sleep and time for personal hygiene and meals; they do not need (and we cannot afford) 12 hours out of the fight.
5. At the completion of each step of the planning process, and at a minimum when the OPORD is complete, the S2 planners should brief the entire section on the next mission.

(TA.5 Intelligence)

TREND 2: Reconnaissance.

PROBLEMS:
1. Reconnaissance operations routinely fail.
2. It has become an afterthought, and "S2 business", rather than the brigade's initial main effort. 3. No one is truly in charge of the effort, tracks it, adjusts it when necessary, and ensures that it answers the Commander's PIR.
4. R&S operations are often not rehearsed.
5. In some instances, the brigade does not know whether the task forces are able to execute their assigned missions under the plan.

RESULTS:
1. R&S efforts are usually reduced to a matrix in the Intelligence Annex (which only the S2s read).
2. The matrix addresses NAIs covering all known or templated enemy locations, but does not adequately address task and purpose for each mission or recon element.
3. If mission adjustments are necessary, the S2 does not have the tasking authority to redirect recon assets. and usually must request subordinate elements to change their plans.

Techniques:
1. Appoint a Chief of Reconnaissance at brigade level. We have an officer in charge of chemicals, why not recon?
2. Give the Chief of Recon a small, part-time planning staff, and the equipment and authority to task and receive reports from all elements of the brigade for reconnaissance missions.

(TA.5.1 Develop Tactical Intelligence Requirements)

TREND 3: Task Force S2 planning and coordination of Ground Surveillance Radar (GSR) operations.

PROBLEMS:
1. Task force S2s do not have a clear understanding of how to utilize GSR teams at the TF level and below.
2. They are not including GSR teams in the TF OPORD or R&S plan.
3. When they give a mission to GSR teams, there is no clear task and purpose.
4. Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC) procedures continue to be a problem between the TF and GSR teams.

 Techniques:
1. Foster better habitual relationships between GSR teams and TFs.
2. Develop training scenarios at Home Station to train the TF S2s on how to utilize GSR teams.
3. Make it the GSR Platoon Leader's and PSG's responsibility to ensure that their teams are included in OPORDs at all levels.
4. GSR Platoon Leaders and PSGs should have more input in mission planning.
5. Team leaders should have input in the development of the R&S plan, to be sure that the team can accomplish the mission.
6. The TF S2 must make sure that the task and purpose is clear and understood by the team before deployment.
7. Train at all levels to develop effective CASEVAC plans.

(TA.5.1 Develop Tactical Intelligence Requirements   )

TREND 4: Planning, synchronizing, and supervising the reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) effort.

PROBLEMS:
1. Task force and squadron S2s, S3s, and commanders continue to inadequately plan and supervise R&S operations.
2. Task force staffs do not convey an appreciation for technical abilities of R&S assets, required force protection (CS) or sustainment (CSS) operations.

RESULTS:
1. R&S assets are overtasked by superimposing repetitive and redundant collection requirements.
2. Failure to coordinate R&S efforts with staff to include adjacent and higher headquarters often leads to the loss of lives and poorly executed or unsuccessful plans.

Technique: If task force S2s are on the blame line for planning and supervising R&S, then it is essential they receive the necessary CS and CSS support and authority required for success. Task force commanders and S3s must recognize their role in R&S planning and supervision. This will allow TF and squadron S2s time to analyze recon data and recommend redirection of collection efforts.

(TA.5.1 Develop Tactical Intelligence Requirements)

TREND 5: Integration of Scout Platoon in reconnaissance planning, preparation and execution. Task Forces (TF) too often do not integrate reconnaissance planning, preparation, execution, and support into Home Station training. This critical training is often left to the Scout Platoon Leader, with little or no integration of other TF assets.

RESULTS:
1. Scouts are rendered combat ineffective early and do contribute to TF mission success.
2. The commander and staff are limited in gathering intelligence necessary for planning and execution and must rely on other varied means to collect that critical information.

Techniques:
1. Task Force must assume responsibility for recon training and integration at Home Station.
2. R&S planning must be integrated into every orders drill so usable products are produced prior to R&S execution.
3. Scout Platoon focus in training should be directed toward enemy or friendly decision points, thereby facilitating the decision making process.
4. TF success relies on the proper integration of the Scouts into the reconnaissance effort which can only be affective with sufficient combat power marshaled to ensure their survival.
 5. Allow Scouts time to execute proper troop leading procedures.

(TA.5.1 Develop Tactical Intelligence Requirements)

TREND 6: Reconnaissance and Surveillance plan development.

PROBLEMS:
1. The Task Force S2s are often the only ones developing the R&S effort.
2. The Scouts usually leave for a mission with only an execution matrix, minus the details needed for fire integration or CASEVAC. At times they even leave without an enemy SITEMP and with weak, non-prioritized PIRs which are not linked to NAIs.

RESULTS:
1. Plan is developed late.
2. Orders produced are not integrated products with input from each of the staff elements, and are therefore incomplete.
3. R&S products generated lack critical pieces of information.
4. Scouts prepare for mission without details necessary for success. Because the details are incomplete time used to prepare for mission is wasted and troop leading procedures suffer.

Techniques:
1. R&S plan needs to be an integrated product.
2. TF should produce an R&S OPORD written by the S-3 with input from the other staff.
3. The S-2 should include the enemy SITEMP in the order.

(TA.5.1 Develop Tactical Intelligence Requirements)

TREND 7: Integration of Air Defense into the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB). A lack of integration in the air portion of the IPB creates a situation where the TF commander gives the Air Defense Officers (ADOs) very general guidance that does not focus on defeating the threat.

RESULTS:
1. Task Force Commander cannot prioritize ADA coverage against threat and balance with his own intent for maneuver on the battlefield.
2. This poor air IPB denied the TF and Company commanders a real appreciation of the enemy air threat and capabilities.
3. TF placement of ADA assets to protect the force at critical points on the battlefield is seriously hampered.

Techniques:
1. TF S-2 and ADO must work closely together to refine/conduct the air IPB and ensure its integration into the SITEMP.
2. Use Home Station training to integrate the ADO into all aspects of planning and the Military Decision Making Process.

(TA. 5.2.1 Collect Information on Situation)

TREND 8: Task Force S2 understanding of IPB process, products and integration. Task force and squadron S2s have a poor appreciation for the application of IPB in relation to either "deliberate planning" or "abbreviated planning" processes.

PROBLEMS:
1. MIOBC, MIOAC, and 96B MOS POIs remain unable to cross boundaries from some form of analytical thinking process to predictive analysis in support of the TF's plan or "decisive point".
2. Task force commanders continually fail to provide guidance for the focus of IPB to include commander's decisive point (s).
3. S2s continually fail to correlate "seeing the terrain", "seeing the enemy", and "see themselves" either verbally or graphically (battlefield vision).
4. Task force operational systems remain unsupportive and nonintegrated within the IPB process.

Procedures:
1. Doctrinal references: FM 34-130, FM 34-80, FM 34-3, FM 34-2-1, FM 17-95/96, and FM 71-123.

Techniques:
1. Task force S2 sections must review Home Station training in relation to:
     - Battle tracking --enemy situational awareness over a extended period under a continuously changing environment.
     - Analytical thinking process and predictive analysis --recognizing and understanding indicators and the task and purpose of battlefield shapers.
     - Parallel planning --restructuring internal assets to support current battles while planning future battles.
2. Training institutions must ensure placement of the best and brightest intelligence officers by allowing field observer controllers the opportunity to directly influence these officers' warfighting skills at MIOBC and MIAOBC.

(TA.5.3 Process Information)

TREND 9: Event templates and matrices in the planning process.

PROBLEMS:
1. S2s do not understand the use of event templates or event matrix and their importance to the planning process.
2. Enemy decision points and NAIs are not clearly defined to planners or commander.

RESULTS:
1. The friendly COAs developed in the planning process and essential to success are seriously flawed.
2. All the products necessary for a thorough planning process are not available.

Techniques:
1. S2s need to familiarize themselves with FM 34-130 and the need for time phase lines NAIs and enemy decision points are critical to friendly COA development.
2. A review should be conducted on the importance of the event template and the event matrix (the companion to the template) to the planning process and how these products contribute to distinguishing the different enemy COAs.

(TA. 5.3.4.1 Develop Enemy Intentions)

TREND 10: Situation Templates (SITEMPS) for use in R&S Planning.

PROBLEMS:
1. SITEMPS are often not available during the R&S planning.
2. TFs are not able to distinguish between when infiltration is possible and when penetration is necessary to achieve the recon objective.
3. A lack of understanding of planning factors for recon.

RESULTS:
1. Scouts selecting or being given routes through enemy security zone positions.
2. The only method of infiltration that provides a reasonable probability of success is dismounted. Dismounted operations are very limited in their scope and sustain ability.
3. TFs repeatedly underestimate the enemies commitment to counterrecon resulting in unrealistic expectations for recon effort.
4. Another consideration is the ability of these scouts to target engineer assets and harass the enemy with indirect fires.

Techniques:
1. Mission analysis products must be part of the R&S planning in order to determine the required composition of the recon force.
2. Availability and positioning of mortars and artillery must be a consideration in targeting enemy engineer and artillery assets.

(TA. 5.3.4.1 Develop Enemy Intentions)

TREND 11: S2 depiction of Brigade Support Area (BSA) decision points.

PROBLEMS:
1. S2s do not depict decision points or target areas of interest keyed to significant events forward and to the rear of the BSA.
2. There is no established time/space relationship to prepare the commander to make tactical decisions relative to battlefield events.
3. S2s do not correlate the enemy operational timetable and friendly operational timetable while identifying decision points, target areas of interest, and time phase lines.
4. Commanders are not making tactical decisions when required relative to battlefield events in and around the BSA.
5. Commanders have not established a decision to time/space relationship which correlates the enemy's operational timetable or friendly timetable.

RESULT: The BSA gets overrun by the enemy or does not execute its save plan in time as the enemy strikes the BSA, destroying all the key logistics that are required to support the Brigade Combat Team (BCT) in its fight.

Technique: The FSB S2/S3 should produce decision support matrix annexes for all possible events, i.e., save plan, dismounted enemy, NBC attacks, artillery, mine fields, etc.
        - These matrixes would enhance decision making while the unit is under immense pressure during an attack.
        - Development of a Decision Support Template (DST) uses products developed throughout the entire planning process. It is not something that is exclusively done after the plan is developed. The goal is to use products that were previously developed during the planning process and create a useful tool that can help the commander make decisions at critical points on the battlefield.
        - The decision support matrix supplements the DST (FM 34-3, page 4-32).

(TA. 5.3.4.1 Develop Enemy Intentions)

TREND 12: IPB and how the enemy fights. S2s routinely show enemy movement, not enemy maneuver plans.

PROBLEM: The enemy, as we do, uses a methodical system of maneuver to fix a part of our defense to keep it out of the fight, while suppressing, breaching, and penetrating another part. S2s often do not do an adequate job in explaining and illustrating how the enemy maneuvers.
EXAMPLE: When the enemy attacks, the S2 shows how the enemy will move its units in, for example, advance guard formation. The S2 does not show how this dynamic force will fix, breach, and penetrate defensive battle positions.

Techniques:
1. Since S2s are not schooled in maneuver, they should ask S3 battle captains for help or read 71 series FMs to become familiar with maneuver.
2. Use "snapshot" sketches that show enemy maneuvering in the close fight at critical places on the battlefield.

(TA.5.4.2 Prepare Reports on Enemy Intentions)

TREND 13: Use of SITEMPs to confirm or deny enemy courses of action (COAs).
S2 Sections too often fail to use their own SITEMPs as analytical products. They routinely produce SITEMPs of varying quality and utility, but often throw them in a corner and fail to use them once the planning has stopped and execution has begun.

RESULT: Information received is not compared with the SITEMP to confirm or deny particular enemy COAs.

Techniques:
1. S2 Sections should post and use their SITEMPS for reporting enemy COAs.
2. S2 Sections should ensure that the SITEMP or other analytic product is not confused with "hard" intelligence received by using two maps: one analytical map, and one for posting only "hard data".

(TA.5.4.4 Prepare Reports on Enemy Situation)

TREND 14: Terrain Analysis Briefing.
The Assistant Brigade Engineer (ABE), rather than the S2, often briefs terrain analysis during the mission analysis and OPORD briefs.

Technique:
The ABE should continue to assist the S2 in terrain analysis, however we recommend the S2 brief the terrain and its *significance*.

(TA.5.4.5 Convey Intelligence)

MANEUVER BOS

(Trends are numbered sequentially for cross-reference and are <u>not</u> in any priority order.)

Needs Emphasis

TREND 1: Engineer force understanding of maneuver operations. Combat Engineer Companies do not understand how to maneuver and employ weapons systems as a unit or as part of a larger maneuver element.

PROBLEMS:
1. Although engineer companies possess a significant amount of fire power, they seldom establish fire control measures for M2's, MK19's, AT4's or attached M1A1 tanks (plow or roller tanks).
2. Engineer units lack understanding of mounted or dismounted movement formations both at company and platoon level, and do little, if any, actions on contact planning during OPORD development.
3. Engineer Company Commanders are not sufficiently competent to assume the duty as Breach Force Commander, if the supported maneuver commander task organizes Engineers to that role.

Techniques:
1. Combat Engineer leaders must incorporate FM 5 - 71 - 2, appendix E and FM 71-123 chapters 3 & 4 into their leadership development training.
2. Leaders should incorporate force protection training into every training event.
3. Leaders should ensure there is some company collective maneuver training planned and executed each quarter.

(TA.1 Maneuver)

TREND 2: Movement formations and techniques.

PROBLEMS:
1. Task forces and company/teams do not use *movement formations* in conjunction with movement techniques.
2. Units only discuss the movement formation they will use *while they are moving*.

RESULT: Too many elements make contact while using the traveling technique, often in a column formation.

Technique: Plan movement formations in conjunction with movement techniques. Transition to a more secure movement technique as the likelihood of enemy contact increases. Leader control of formations and the selection and execution of appropriate movement techniques should be the start point for maneuver training. FMs 7-7, 71-2 and 71-1 are clear on how to use movement formations and techniques. Units need to *train* and *use* the tactics and techniques discussed in these FMs.

(TA.1.1 Move)

TREND 3: Task Force use of dismounted infantry in scheme of maneuver.

PROBLEMS:
1. Task forces do not effectively use their dismounted infantry.
2. Infantry soldiers are often not integrated into the scheme of maneuver.
3. Because of a lack of clear *task and purpose*, too often infantry soldiers are not used in conjunction with the Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV).
4. When soldiers do dismount from the Bradley, they are too often unprepared to accomplish their mission.
      - they leave essential equipment (radios, AT weapons, etc.) behind
      - they are unfamiliar with the tactical situation
      - they are unsure of what they are to accomplish
5. Most infantry squads are *untrained and are unfamiliar with infantry drill*, as specified in FM 7-7; they often fail to use even a movement formation or technique.

Technique: Units use every possible Home Station training opportunity to train dismounted infantry drills and train their infantry in conjunction with BFV, not as a separate unit. Use the techniques discussed in FM 7-7.

(TA.1.1.1 Position/Reposition Forces (Units and Equipment)

TREND 4: Brigade Support Area (BSA) Target Reference Points.

PROBLEMS:
1. The S3 seldom develops sectors of fire using target reference points (TRPs) that can be seen in the hours of darkness.
2. S2/S3s ARE choosing engagement areas (EAs) from a TOC vehicle versus being on the ground to meet the requirement.

RESULTS:
1. When units do not use TRPs, they do not have interlocking fires and engagement areas.
2. S2/S3s that choose the engagement area for the unit cause lack of coverage, confusion for the unit and soldiers, and the possibility of fratricide incidents.

Technique: Each vehicle should carry one TRP.
      - Materials for the TRP:
            -- two 6 foot long pickets
            -- a 3' x 3' piece of target cloth
            -- 2 scrap pieces of wood
      - Construction:
            -- secure two scrap pieces of wood into the U-shaped portion of the pickets with screws
            -- staple the target cloth to scrap pieces of wood
            -- post a nail into each of the top corners of the TRP for hanging infra-red (IR) chemlights

(TA.1.2.1 Employ Direct-fire)

TREND 5: Actions on contact. Units often do not plan for or rehearse actions on contact.

PROBLEMS:
1. No execution of effective actions on contact to enemy combat multipliers.
2. Reaction to enemy contact often consists of *halting in place and attempting to return fire,* often at targets beyond maximum effect ranges.

RESULTS:
1. Units end up driving into enemy kill sacks.
2. Units are often destroyed in platoon or company "sets."

Techniques:
1. Action on contact drills are adequately discussed in the doctrinal manuals. Units need to practice the actions on contact at Home Station so that they become drills for the unit.
2. Company/Teams must understand how the enemy will employ his combat multipliers and then develop SOPs to focus their training on reactions to multiple forms of contact to maximize force protection.

(TA.1.2.2 Conduct Close Combat)

FIRE SUPPORT BOS

(Trends are numbered sequentially for cross-reference and are <u>not</u> in any priority order.)

<u>Needs Emphasis</u>

TREND 1: Clearance of Fires.

PROBLEMS:
1. The brigade and TF plan did not provide clear graphical control measures to facilitate clearance.
2. No standardized procedures existed for positively clearing fires across the brigade.

RESULTS:
1. The Task Force frequently experienced indirect fire fratricides and indirect fires danger close.
2. The TF suffered excessive delay in mission processing times.

Techniques:
1. Improve clearance of fire procedures by using maneuver graphical control measures, Fire Support Coordination Measures (FSCMs) and clear.
2. Practice procedures to ensure responsive fires without endangering or killing friendly elements.

(TA. 2.1.1 Select Target to Attack)

TREND 2: Registration of Brigade Support Area (BSA) targets into TACFIRE. S3s have difficulty getting BSA targets into TACFIRE, especially the critical friendly zone (CFZ).

PROBLEM: The BSA has no coverage from radar or known targets to shift from.

RESULT: Having no coverage from the Q-36 or Q-37 radars causes the BSA to have continuous fires placed on it without the aid of counterfire to counter the OPFOR artillery.

Techniques:
1. Procedures for ensuring BSA targets are registered in TACFIRE should be reviewed and practiced.
2. OPD/NCOPD classes should be scheduled for fire support/Close Air Support (CAS).
3. The BSA should have a mortar track attached in the defense in order to give it the capability to bring quick fires on dismounted troops in the open who are trying to penetrate the BSA defenses. When a BSA has to implement a save plan, the mortar track could be used for quick smoke missions as the BSA moves to the save site.
4. The service battery commander must be held accountable to produce an overlay with targets and target reference points (TRPs) and the task and purpose of fires in the fire support annex. This information needs to be passed down to the lowest level.
5. The computer printout should be shown to the Forward Support Battalion (FSB) S3 by the service battery commander daily. This will ensure the targets are still in TACFIRE.

(TA.2.1.1 Select Target to Attack)

TREND 3: Combat Observation Lasing Team (COLT) use of Ground/Vehicle Laser Locator Designators (G/VLLDs).

PROBLEMS:
1. COLTs are not deploying forward of the line of departure with a complete (including night sight) G/VLLD system.
2. COLTs are not using their G/VLLDs to obtain refined target locations to obtain first round fire for effect data.
3. When they are not given a specified mission to lase, teams usually opt to leave their G/VLLDs behind at the brigade main.

Technique: COLTs should always carry the complete G/VLLD system, regardless of their assigned task. Based on the COLT's mission to either provide terminal guidance for precision munitions, reconnaissance/surveillance, or as a primary observer for a specified target, the observer must be capable of lasing to refine the target location. The best tool currently available for both day and night is the G/VLLD.

(TA.2.2.1.2 Adjust/Illuminate Fire Support Targets)

AIR DEFENSE BOS

(Trends are numbered sequentially for cross-reference and are <u>not</u> in any priority order.)

Needs Emphasis

TREND 1: Programming IFF (Interrogation Friend or Foe) for Avenger. IFF is often either not programmed to standard, or is not programmed at all.

PROBLEMS:
1. Platoons fail to acquire/coordinate for AKAT-3662 (key tape) prior to arrival to NTC.
2. Units consistently fail to bring the necessary equipment to properly program.

Techniques:
1. Ensure proper coordination for AKAT-3662 (key tape) occurs at Home Station prior to deployment to NTC.
2. All units should deploy with all assigned equipment, to include:
- AKAT-3662 (key tape)
- KIR-1C (computer)
- GSX-1A (programmer/battery charger)

(TA.3.1 Process Air Targets)

TREND 2: Directed Early Warning (Air Defense).

PROBLEMS:
1. Directed early warning is not being rebroadcast in a timely manner to soldier/crew levels. 2. This warning should be transmitted in a language for all soldiers to understand.

RESULTS:
1. At TF level there is normally a breakdown because there is no ADA representative in the TF TOC during the battle (the ADO fights from his BSFV).
2. The TF normally reacts poorly to air attack.

Techniques:
1. Directed early warning defines the local air defense warning (LADW) and states whether the aircraft is friendly, hostile or unknown, a cardinal direction, and if known the most likely affected asset within the force.
2. Directed early warning is designated to alert a particular unit, units or area of the battlefield of an immediate or possible threat. It is passed over unit command net or nets designated by the unit as flash precedents traffic.
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(TA. 3.1.1 Select Air Targets to Attack)

TREND 3: Bradley Stinger Fighting Vehicle (BSFV) platoon receipt of early warning information. BSFV platoons have inadequate SOPs for receiving early warning information.

PROBLEM: Some platoon SOPs for communication plans direct that no BSFV platoon elements monitor the Division Early Warning (DEW) net. Instead, platoons monitor the ADA battery command net which is tasked to monitor and retransmit all early warning information. This system is inadequate because:
       - the ADA battery cannot always maintain communications with all subordinate elements due to terrain/distance
       - lack of redundancy

Techniques:
1. BSFV platoon communications plans should have at least one squad per section monitor the DEW net.
2. The ADA platoon leader and the platoon sergeant/squad leader should monitor the battery net (FM 44-43, Chapter 2).

(TA.3.1.1 Select Air Targets to Attack)

MOBILITY/SURVIVABILITY BOS &
NUCLEAR/BIOLOGICAL/CHEMICAL (NBC)

(Trends are numbered sequentially for cross-reference and are <u>not</u> in any priority order.)

Needs Emphasis
TREND 1: Nuclear/Biological/Chemical (NBC) Operations.
PROBLEMS:
1. Most NBC staffs arrive at NTC without an NBC TACSOP-1.
2. Task Forces arrive at NTC without standard procedures for NBC avoidance (FM 3-3), protection (FM 3-4), decontamination (FM 3-5), or defense (FM 3-100).
3. Task forces do not understand how to plan or execute NBC operations, smoke operations, or respond to chemical attacks.
RESULTS:
1. Units do not report chemical attacks in a timely manner.
2. Operational and thorough decon operations are not resourced and executed to standard.
3. Patient decon operations are inadequate due to lack of trained crews and equipment.
4. Smoke operations are not planned, prepared, and executed IAW FM 3-50.
5. M8 alarms are placed next to the defensive perimeter instead of 150 meters out for early warning.6. Soldiers arrive without MOPP gear and do not understand the different levels of MOPP.
7. There is inadequate cross talk between the different levels of the NBC staff.
8. There are inadequate and ineffective command and control/support relationships between TF and chemical assets.
Techniques:
1. Produce, implement, and validate a workable NBC TACSOP at Home Station.
      - References:
            -- FM 3-3 (chemical/biological contamination avoidance)
            -- FM 3-4 (NBC Protection)
            -- FM 3-5 (NBC decontamination)
            -- FM 3-100 (NBC defense, chemical warfare, smoke and flame operations)
            -- FM 3-101 (chemical staffs and units).
2. Create an NBC working environment IAW FM 3-101, page 5-3 (Chemical staff considerations). Chemical staffs at TF force level should:
- identify the NBC threat
- determine if current chemical force is sufficient
- monitor the status of NBC defense equipment in the TF
- monitor the status of NBC preparedness in the force
- develop training plans to correct NBC defense training deficiencies
- develop chemical support plans to support current operations
- develop NBC defense plans to protect the force
- monitor the NBC situation
- monitor the status of chemical units
- recommend changes to the plan based on the NBC situation
- coordinate with higher headquarters for support as necessary
- continuously update the commander on all NBC operations
- remain technically and tactically proficient in all NBC issues as they relate to the TF mission
3. Improve cross talk between company and battalion NBC personnel. Create a program that ensures the battalion NBC staff discuss NBC issues regularly with their company counterparts.

(TA.6.3 Enhance Survivability)

TREND 2: Control of marked contaminated areas. Units that identify contaminated areas are continuing to have problems keeping follow-on forces out of the contamination.

PROBLEMS:
1. Units will usually put out the NBC-1 Report over O/I net even though most tactical SOPs (TACSOPs) say to put it out over command nets.
2. M93 FOX vehicles that conduct NBC recon will mark the contaminated area, but the markers used by FOX crews are often not seen, and other vehicles run right over them.
3. Units coming into the contamination have the NBC-1 Report plotted on their maps, but their situational awareness is so poor, they do not realize where they are.
RESULT: Follow-on forces continue to pile into the contamination, violating the principal of contamination avoidance.
Techniques:
1. Use available assets to assist in the control of the site.
    - Use MPs as traffic control posts (TCPs) to ensure vehicles do not enter the contamination.
    - Make the FOX vehicle the last to go to decon and assist the MPs to keep vehicles out. Everyone recognizes a FOX and knows what it does. This should be an indicator for any unsuspecting vehicles/soldiers.
2. Ensure the NBC reports go out on the right nets as stated in the unit TACSOP.
3. Use other visual signals to aid in the identification of the contamination such as purple smoke. The FOX crews can carry the smoke and use it when vehicles approach.

(TA.6.3.1 Provide Battlespace Hazard Protection)

TREND 3: Electronic Warfare (EW) team survivability.
PROBLEMS:
1. Electronic Warfare teams are too often not taking the appropriate actions to ensure their system's survivability.
2. They are failing to pull security during site reconnaissance and occupation.
3. They are not locating their OP/LPS where they have good 360 degree visibility of the area around their system.
4. They fail to ensure that they have a communications link (either a TA-312 or PRC-119) between the OP/LP and the system hut.
5. They do not employ an M8 chemical agent detector and alarm, or they employ the M8 in the wrong location.
6. They are not using camouflage netting to conceal their Electronic Warfare systems.
7. They are not cleaning or maintaining their individual and crew served weapons to ensure that they are prepared to defend themselves, if required.

Techniques:
1. NCOs must supervise their subordinates and enforce the standards in their unit's SOPs.
2. Electronic Warfare team leaders and platoon sergeants should conduct thorough pre-combat checks and inspections (PCCs/PCIs) to ensure that teams have all the necessary equipment on hand and in a serviceable condition.
    - use a checklist that includes such items as communications gear, M8 alarm, batteries for all equipment, camouflage netting, and weapons cleaning supplies.
    - continuously supervise teams to ensure they are taking all appropriate security measures.
    - use a site occupation and security checklist.
3. Teams should include the above security measures in their crew drills, and they must drill these survivability skills at home station in FTXs and during routine crew drills.

(TA.6.3.1.1 Protect Individuals and Systems)

TREND 4: Medical company's role in defense of the brigade support area (BSA). The medical company is seldom given a clear task and purpose for their defense and the defense of the BSA.

PROBLEMS:
1. Medical companies often dig a number of hasty fighting positions in a 360 degree circle around the company area, but have no ability to concentrate fires and no understanding of the most likely and most dangerous enemy avenues of approach.
2. Medical companies deploy without enough Class IV barrier supplies.

Techniques:
1. Develop a standard survivability position for each soldier assigned in the vicinity of their work area. This will ensure each soldier has a protected position in the event of indirect fires.
2. Determine the total Class IV requirement for the company and establish load plans.
3. The medical company commander obtains from the S2/S3 the most likely and most dangerous enemy avenues of approach. Fighting positions are prepared based on this information to enable massing of the fires he has available.

(TA.6.3.1.1 Protect Individuals and Systems)

TREND 5: Bradley Stinger Fighting Vehicle (BSFV) squad preparation of fighting positions. BSFV squads often construct inadequate fighting positions.

PROBLEM: BSFV squads often construct overhead cover by building an outer ring of sandbags 18" deep and fill the interior with a minimum of 18" of loose sand and dirt. This does not provide adequate protection to survive a 152mm artillery round at 50 feet since loose dirt is not as protective as layers of dirt in sandbags.

Technique: BSFV squads should use interlocking layers of sandbags at least 18" deep. The sandbags increase the density and the stability of overhead cover (FM 5-103 Survivability, Chapter 3).

(TA.6.3.1.1 Protect Individuals and Systems)

TREND 6: Logistics units' defensive operations. Logistics units experience difficulty in balancing their CSS missions with defensive operations.

PROBLEMS:
1. Most logistics leaders do not understand how to conduct a defense by squad, an essential building block to a cohesive defensive plan, and one of the Army's FY97 Common Task Testing (CTT) requirements.
    - During the past two quarters, out of 70 logistics NCOs questioned 65% did not know how to conduct a squad defense.
    - Most of these NCOs stated they did not take common task tests.
2. Forward Support Battalions' (FSBs) defenses have no depth to them and are not actively supervised by the officers or NCOs at battalion and company level.
3. Soldiers lack needed competency to succeed in defending the Brigade Support Area (BSA).

RESULTS:
1. Ad-hoc defensive operations leading to unorganized chaos on the battlefield during an attack.
2. Soldiers cause numerous fratricide incidents to one another.
3. The OPFOR reaches its end state either observing or destroying the BSA.

Techniques:
1. All officers and NCOs should be required to take CTT and exhibit the basic fundamental soldier skills required of a leader.
2. The S3 should set up a training program at Home Station that produces quality OPs, access control points, and a quick-reaction force. These soldiers need to understand all actions on contact and battle drills of the Battalion.

(TA 6.3.1.1.3 Prepare Protective Positions)

TREND 7: Employment of the M8A1 Alarm. M8A1 alarms are seldom employed to standard.

PROBLEMS:
1. Soldiers who are signed for and responsible for the M8A1 alarm are often not proficient in its employment, maintenance, and operation.
    - They are not placed upwind.
    - They are not place at the proper distance that would provide the unit early warning of chemical attack.
    - They do not put them out at all; they are more concerned about someone driving over it than providing early warning.
    - They do not know *how* to put the alarm into operation.
    - They do not deploy with enough batteries, maintenance kits, or wire to run the alarm.
2. Units often deploy to the training area with up to 25% of the alarms *deadlined*.

Techniques:
1. Develop a training plan for M8A1 operators.
2. Require units to certify their operators by attending a course that is given by the battalion chemical NCO.
    - Once certified, operators will be issued a training certificate.
    - The certification program will be part of the inspection program.
3. For those units that do have certification programs in place and do not train NBC on a frequent basis, develop a sustainment training program. This program should be quarterly and also added to the inspection program.

(TA.6.3.1.1.4 Employ Protective Equipment)

TREND 8: Medical company use of M8A1 Alarms.

PROBLEMS:
1. The medical company has one of three authorized M8A1 Alarms but they do not often place it out in accordance with the latest down wind message.
2. When the alarm is placed properly, the power source is usually not hooked up and wire is not run to the alarm.

RESULTS:
1. During a chemical attack, the M8A1 Alarm does not go off warning company soldiers of the presence of nerve agents.
2. determination of the type of agent that is present in the company area is delayed.

Procedure: Employ the M8A1 Alarm IAW procedures described in Chapter 3 of FM 3-3.

(TA.6.3.1.1.4 Employ Protective Equipment)

TREND 9: Search and destroy enemy reconnaissance forces.

PROBLEMS:
1. Too often, there is no effort made to search out and destroy enemy recon forces. Security operations at the brigade level tend to be limited to a permeable screen at the FEBA. The usual brigade security effort is one counterrecon company per task force, which lines up along a phase line and does nothing more. The brigade seldom takes other actions to search for and destroy recon forces operating throughout the depth of our AO.
2. Counterrecon forces are given other missions which detract from their ability to perform the security mission.
3. As the overall plan is developed, security operations are an afterthought, once the base plan is developed.

Techniques:
1. Commit a force capable of finding and destroying the enemy recon forces throughout the depth of the AO. This may need to be a total combined arms force, integrating "lookers" other than just the thermal sights of M1s and M2s.
2. Give the counterrecon force *no other mission*.
3. Plan security operations early and with the same amount of attention and support given to any other combat operation.

(TA.6.3.4 Provide Counterreconnaissance, Security and Readiness)

TREND 10: Security Operations.

PROBLEMS:
1. HMMWV scout platoons do not contribute significantly to security operations.
2. HMMWV scouts have very limited night viewing capability compared to M1 tanks and Bradleys and no ability to destroy anything they do observe.

RESULTS:
1. The Scouts often prevent the TF from being successful by confusing the shooters on identification of enemy vehicles especially beyond 1200 meters. The time that a potential enemy recon target is observed is often 3 to 5 minutes at most.
2. Confusion is created by similar looking vehicles, HMMWVs and BRDMs, operating in the same area.
3. Scouts behind the shooters cannot see as far as the shooters.

Techniques:
1. Security operations should not be given to company/teams alone.
2. Scouts contribute more to the defense by establishing OPs behind the security force that enable the TF to track the enemy through the sector and call accurate and timely indirect fires on him while the TF is in the direct fire fight.
3. Screening involves destruction within capabilities, this limits scouts to destruction with indirect fires which is more effective against large formations than individual vehicles.
4. Integration of mission analysis products into R&S planning to allow battlefield calculus to determine the required composition of the recon force to include the availability and positioning of mortars and artillery.

(TA. 6.3.4 Provide Counter reconnaissance, Security and Readiness)

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT BOS

(Trends are numbered sequentially for cross-reference and are <u>not</u> in any priority order.)

Positive Performance

TREND 1: Military Police (MP) knowledge of weapons capabilities and maintenance.
Military Police leaders and soldiers consistently demonstrate superior knowledge of weapons capabilities and maintenance. Most platoons have several soldiers who have undergone formal training as armorers. This is significant to note because MP platoons must use M2 .50 cal machine guns during National Training Center rotations, even though these weapons are not, normally, organic to their units.

Technique: Continue the solid weapons training at Home Station. Most platoons do not receive an unusual amount of "wet fire" training at their units; they do, however, receive intensive pre-marksmanship instruction (PMI). Continued leader emphasis on weapons training will ensure that this trend continues.

(TA.7.4.5 Train Tactical Units and Personnel)

Needs Emphasis

TREND 1: Resupply of argon for the Avenger weapons system. Units too often do not deploy to the NTC with argon supply bottles or an argon pumping unit for resupply.

RESULT: Argon is as important as Class III or V. Without argon, the Avenger system is not mission capable (NMC).

Techniques:
1. As Avenger platoons are "sliced" to Gun Batteries (i.e. BSFV/Stinger) during Home Station training and prior to deployment to the NTC, the platoon should come with all equipment necessary to sustain combat operations.
2. Since the Avenger MILES FOFT (trainer system) requires argon for operation, it is *very* important that units come prepared to pump argon.

(TA.7.3.2 Fix/Maintain Equipment)

TREND 2: Task force preparation of the maintenance estimate.

PROBLEMS:
1. Maintenance estimates are not generally conducted or not conducted to standard.
2. Maintenance estimates are not fully integrated into the logistics estimate.
3. Task force commanders generally do not ask for nor do they receive a briefing on the maintenance status of the task force.
RESULT: The task force does not know its maintenance status or expected requirements.

Techniques:
1. In Home Station training, include:
  - the preparation of a maintenance estimate IAW FM 43-5
  - the integration of the maintenance estimate into the logistics estimate by the task force CSS planners IAW FM 71-2 Chapter 7
2. Task force logistical planners must make a concerted effort to include the battalion maintenance officer (BMO) in the planning process, specifically COA development and analysis.

(TA.7.3.2 Fix/Maintain Equipment)

TREND 3: Task force maintenance platoon task organization. The Task force maintenance platoon sometimes has problems with task organization.

PROBLEMS:
1. Most units are insufficiently staffed with tank and Bradley system mechanics and turret mechanics to maintain the vehicle fleet.
2. Although shortages of required personnel are known at Home Station, most units wait until after arriving at NTC to develop a plan to minimize the impact of their personnel shortages.

Techniques:
1. Clearly identify maintenance support needs of the task force (vice battalion) and structure our field organization accordingly.
2. Clearly identify the support requirements of all task force equipment and meet those support requirements.
3. If a shortage of maintenance personnel exists, centralize control of the limited personnel asset and prioritize units to be supported. The maintenance personnel then work on the unit's vehicles in unit order of priority.

(TA.7.3.2 Fix/Maintain Equipment)

TREND 4: Task force control of unit maintenance collection point (UMCP) traffic.

PROBLEMS:
1. Task forces have difficulty controlling the flow of vehicles in and out of unit maintenance collection points (UMCPs).
2. Task forces often have fully mission-capable vehicles remaining in the UMCP for long periods of time.
3. Once vehicles are released from the UMCP, task forces often have problems successfully linking up the vehicles with their units prior to execution.

Techniques:
1. The UMCP should be given enough class IV material to create a "fence" with one exit/entrance.
2. UMCP leaders should designate a "gate guard" to control traffic in and out of the UMCP. 3. The task force leadership should take an active interest in controlling the link-up of repaired vehicles with their units. Too often, the only parties involved in the linkup are the battalion maintenance officer (BMO) and the individual vehicle commanders.

(TA.7.3.2 Fix/Maintain Equipment)

TREND 5: Preventive Maintenance Checks and Services (PMCS).

PROBLEMS:
1. The average unit at NTC accomplishes PMCS in 48-72 hours. The desired turn-around time on PMCS of combat systems is 24 hours. This goal is accomplished by *less than 10%* of the units that arrive at the NTC.
2. Crews do not have a system of turning in combat systems for PMCS.
3. 1SGs and Platoon SGTs, are not involved in the planning of LOGPAC synchronization.
4. The Battalion Maintenance Officer (BMO) and XO establish a plan during RSOI only when coached, and NCOs basically execute on constantly-changing guidance from the task force XO.
5. The PMCS system is not tested in garrison or during field training exercises (FTXs) prior to deployment, and are therefore setting the conditions for failure.
6. DA Forms 2404 are often submitted with signatures/administrative data missing and/or identified faults having no corrective action taken.
7. Due to a shortage of experienced mechanics, units are not using the diagnostic equipment (breakout boxes/STE-ICE) available to them to determine all vehicle faults. Consequently, installing parts does not always correct the deficiency and vehicles remain in a "C" status for extended periods of time.

Techniques:
1. Break the cycle of weekly PMCS while at Home Station. Test the PMCS system in garrison and during FTXs before deployment.
2. The task force leadership must place greater emphasis on the training and conduct of operator PMCS and troubleshooting IAW the appropriate -10/-20 manual.

(TA.7.3.2.1 Perform Preventive Maintenance)

TREND 6: Evacuation of disabled equipment. Units typically do not use maintenance doctrine repair timelines to evacuate equipment out of the Unit Maintenance Collection Point (UMCP).

PROBLEMS:
1. Organizational maintenance drags combat systems around the battlefield until repaired.
2. In over 12 rotations, only 1 M119 Howitzer (British light gun) has been evacuated to the Bravo Company in the Brigade Support Area (BSA).
3. The Maintenance Support Teams (MSTs) repair as far forward as possible, but do not consider time a factor when repairing equipment.

RESULT:
1. The Bravo Company usually repairs only wheeled vehicles in the BSA.
2. The only workload that occurs in Bravo company from the task forces (TFs) are in radio repair.
3. The Bravo Company is never stressed from workload and manhours.

Procedure: Follow doctrinal timelines in order to test the long-term campaign tempo.

(TA.7.3.2.2 Recover)

TREND 7: Use of Simplified Test Equipment (STE) and Break-out Boxes (BOB). Units too often do not use Simplified Test Equipment (STE) or Break-out Boxes (BOB) in their troubleshooting (TS) procedures.

PROBLEMS:
1. Units usually swing-test fault diagnosis.
2. Units typically split the BOB into two parts - half forward, half back. Having the equipment in separate locations does not facilitate the use of the equipment.

Technique: Place the BOB either forward in the UMCP or field trains to facilitate its use.

(TA.7.3.2.3 Diagnose)

TREND 8: Employment of the chaplain assistant. Chaplain assistants are not often employed to the fullest extent possible.

PROBLEMS:
1. The work of the chaplain assistant covers a broad range of tasks in security, logistics, administration and, in lieu of the chaplain, ministry. Chaplain assistants frequently receive inadequate guidance from chaplains, and are therefore limited in the scope of their activities.
2. Unit Ministry Team (UMT) battle drills seldom occur, limiting the effectiveness of a chaplain assistant.
3. UMTs often arrive at the NTC with religious support plans that are not tailored specifically for current missions. This forces both chaplain and assistant to play 'catch up' rather than allowing them to immediately get into the mission planning process.

RESULT: The chaplain assistant ends up performing isolated tasks rather than assisting the chaplain in development and execution of a comprehensive religious support program.

Techniques:
1. Battle drills help UMTs organize specific tasks into logical sequences that utilize time and resources wisely.
2. Chaplains must assist their chaplain assistants by providing them with clear, and regular, guidance.
3. Chaplains and assistants must be conversant with their supported units' METL. Periodic and pre-deployment review of the METL will assist the chaplain in formulating guidance for the chaplain assistant. The chaplain assistant then can be empowered to develop battle drills (or UMT drills) which will assist both chaplain and assistant in providing comprehensive ministry to their supported unit.
4. Chaplain and assistant represent a 'duet' not two soloists. Regular guidance from the chaplain must include an overall vision (which will reflect the commander's intent for a given mission) which is communicated to the chaplain assistant. The chaplain and assistant should review the guidance together to insure that both understand it.

(TA.7.4.3.4 Perform Chaplaincy Activities)

TREND 9: Deployment of the medical company in the Brigade Support Area (BSA).

PROBLEM: Medical companies frequently do not utilize an established layout to employ their assets when they occupy a new area of operations.

RESULT: No coordinated traffic flow of vehicles through the company area or patients through the treatment facility.

Techniques:
1. Develop a standard template to assist in the layout of the company area.
2. Establish and enforce one route through the company area; adjust based on terrain, but do not change the one-route concept. Place along the established traffic route:
- the command post
- maintenance area
- Class VIII resupply point
- fuel point

(TA.7.4.4 Provide Health Services)

TREND 10: Medical company management of maintenance and supplies. Medical company commanders do not have systems in place to manage and track the brigade's medical assets.

RESULTS:
1. Medical evacuation platforms go into a non-mission capable (NMC) status and are not identified as such for up to 72 hours.
2. The medical company has ambulances available but does not react since they are unaware that evacuation platforms are NMC.
3. Task force medical platoons, company medics and unit combat lifesavers run out of medical supplies and are unable to care for casualties.
4. The medical company has additional Class VIII on hand but does not push it forward.

Technique: Work out a system between the medical platoons within the brigade combat team (BCT) and the medical company in the form of a brief standard report that gives their current status on maintenance and Class VIII.
   - Design a simple report form that can be passed either by FM or ambulance messenger.
   - The form must be *easy* and *fast* to promote its use by the platoon leaders.

(TA.7.4.4 Provide Health Services)

TREND 11: Training of Brigade Support Area quick-reaction forces (QRF). Soldiers are not trained to standard to be successful in Brigade Support Area (BSA) quick-reaction forces (QRF) live fires.

PROBLEMS:
1. The Forward Support Battalion (FSB) has a problem defining the standard, communicating the standard, and enforcing the standard to its QRF.
   - no brief-backs conducted
   - no combat life savers in the QRF
   - lack of medical evacuation plan
   - lack of confirmation brief
   - no soldier and NCO knowledge of troop leading procedures
   - incorrect defense mission conducted by QRF commanders (hasty defense vs deliberate defense)
   - fighting positions not prepared to standard
   - no range cards, target reference points (TRPs), etc.
   - soldiers not briefed on mission
   - limited rehearsals
   - limited communication--no field phones (hot loop)
   - PCIs not conducted IAW the SOP
   - QRF commander only has a copy of the tactical SOP (TACSOP)
   - lack of numerous factors of METT-T
      -- specified tasks
      -- implied tasks
      -- essential and restated mission and constraints in the mission factor
   - no soldier knowledge of how to identify the enemy or the enemy's strengths or capabilities
   - no controls for identification of friendly or enemy vehicles
   - poor state of training in the troops available
   - *good morale*
   - no analysis by the QRF leadership from both friendly and enemy point of view in the area of observation, concealment, obstacles, key terrain, and avenues of approach (OCOKA)
   - MOPP suits left in the vehicles, not with the soldiers
   - no priority of work
   - no request to place an observation post forward when prepping the fighting position
   - no signal operation instructions (SOI) with the QRF
   - no disengagement actions planned
   - no knowledge of how to use close air support (CAS) or fire support in their missions
   - no soldier or NCO understanding of what a warning order is
   - incorrect format reporting for spot reports, contact reports, etc.
   - the combat ratio specified in the order never achieved

Techniques:
1. The S3 should set up a training program at Home Station that produces quality OPs, access controllers, and a quick reaction force. Call it the OP/QRF Certification Course.
- These soldiers need to understand all actions on contact and battle drills of the battalion.
- The program should be conducted just like the combat lifesaver course.
- Brief it at Quarterly Training Briefs.
- The course should be demanding--soldiers who pass the course should be recognized with a military certificate to breed competition among soldiers

RESULT: A quality standardized security element that the FSB can draw upon when deployed.
2. Soldiers must understand and visualize how to emplace an engagement area (EA).
3. The QRF must adhere to a pre-combat inspection check list.
4. The QRF must use target reference points and understand the importance of proofing an EA.
5. The commanders must become more aware of troop leading procedures, confirmation briefs, and briefbacks. The leadership of the FSB must hold individuals accountable for their lack of attention to detail.
6. At Home Station, the FSB must practice setting up EAs tied into the enemy's avenues of approach during MILES and live fire training opportunity.
7. The FSB must rehearse in the degraded mode moving from one position to the next.
8. All soldiers must be highly trained in calling for fire and bringing CAS on the enemy.
9. The FSB must understand the weapon capabilities that it has and the capability of the enemy systems.
10. Soldiers must practice target acquisition and must be able to differentiate between enemy and friendly forces and systems.
11. The FSB must ensure that the QRF's activities are fully covered in the FSB's TACSOP, EXAMPLE: The QRF withdrawing under enemy pressure, the MEDEVAC procedures, and the basic loads that the QRF can carry.
12. Personnel should be trained to superior standards on weapons.

(TA.7.4.5 Train Tactical Units and Personnel)

TREND 12: Uploading ammunition to a Class V Facility.

PROBLEM: Ammunition shipments from the Field Ammunition Supply Point (FASP) are often not documented using proper supply procedures. The shipments are processed in the same manner as issues, using a DA Form 581 instead of a Transportation Cargo Manifest Document (TCMD).

RESULT: This short-cut creates a potential void in the audit trail.

Techniques:
1. Ammunition shipped from the FASP should be processed using a TCMD (DA Form 1348-1).
2. Ammunition Transfer Point (ATP) personnel should use the DA Form 581 to issue the ammunition to the requesting unit.
3. Make this part of the unit's SOP and train it at Home Station.

(TA.7.5.1.1 Conduct Terminal Operations)

TREND 13: Ammunition Transfer Point (ATP).

PROBLEM: Ammunition convoys moving forward from the Field Ammunition Supply Point (FASP) are often not clear concerning the location of the Brigade Support Area's (BSA's) Ammunition Transfer Point (ATP).

RESULT: This delays establishment of the ATP and ultimately delays receipt of ammunition by the customer.

Techniques:
1. Convoy commanders must be clear on their exact destination and who to contact when there is a link-up problem.
2. All personnel involved in the operation, to include the Forward Support Battalion (FSB) Support Operations Officer (SPO) and ATP personnel, must know when to expect the convoy to arrive.

(TA.7.5.1.2 Move/Evacuate Cargo, Equipment, and Personnel)

TREND 14: MI Company sustainment and support.

PROBLEMS:
1. An increasing number of MI companies are deploying to the NTC without the requisite amount of logistical support to sustain themselves.
2. In an attempt to provide inexpensive IEW support, units deploy without organic recovery or refueling vehicles or fail to draw them.
3. Units rely on the brigade HHC to fulfill these requirements for them.

RESULTS:
1. MI companies are employed across a large brigade battle space and burdened logistically.
2. Brigade HHCs are stretched past their ability to support.

Procedure: *Follow doctrine* and use MI battalion logistic slices to support MI companies.

(TA.7.5.2 Supply the Force)

TREND 15: Management of Class IV and V barrier material.

PROBLEM: Units have difficulty establishing various responsibilities for the management of Class IV and V barrier material.

RESULTS:
1. Efforts fall short of having the right materials at the right place at the right time.
2. Engineer battalions and maneuver brigades have no accurate status of Class IV and V quantities and locations.

Techniques:
1. Units must be able to accurately account for Class IV and V barrier material from when it enters the brigade sector through it's emplacement in an obstacle.
2. The *maneuver brigade* should take responsibility of the Class IV and V delivery as it enters the brigade sector on echelon above brigade (EAB) transportation assets as stated in FM 71-3. *Engineers have a vested interest* in this event and should monitor the planning and execution closely.
3. The brigade should plan and coordinate for a logistics release point (LRP) vicinity of brigade rear area where EAB trucks are broken down into task force (TF) convoys.
    - No materials are downloaded/ transloaded at this point.
    - The engineer battalion should have a representative there who knows the brigade obstacle resourcing plan and priorities so he can quickly break the vehicles down.
    - TF representatives linkup at this point to escort the EAB transportation assets forward to the TF Class IV/V point.
4. From the LRP area forward, the TF is responsible for escorting the transport assets.
    - Once the trucks are guided to the TF IV/V point, they are quickly downloaded and returned to their LRP for release.
    - Based on METT-T, the materials are either unbanded and uncrated at the TF Class IV/V point, or transloaded onto TF or FSB assets be placed to mine dumps supporting individual obstacle groups.
5. *Engineer/TF cooperation* is the key. The TF owns the Class IV/V point but the engineers must have a representative there to ensure the following:
    - Materials are used IAW TF Commander countermobility priorities.
    - Materials are accurately tracked and status forwarded to the engineer company TOC.
    - TF soldiers used as labor augmentees understand the mine handling/preparation tasks.
6. The Palletized Loading System (PLS) offers units the advantage of moving flat racks directly to the mine dumps supporting obstacle groups. If this method is used, the TF uncrating/ prep details are needed there. Transportation and life support issues must be planned in advance to maximize the output of this labor force. The TF labor details have four functions at the Class IV/V point/mine dump:
    - Uncrate
    - Inspect/prep mines
    - Organize into minefield (MF) or strip feeder packs
    - Palletize/band excess materials for retrograde
7. At the obstacle group mine dumps, engineer platoons must accurately track and forward quantities used and remaining when they leave that area. This information must be reported to the company TOC and forwarded to the TF S4 so he can arrange for assets to pickup unused materials and flat racks if the PLS system is used.

(TA.7.5.2 Supply the Force)

TREND 16: Field Artillery battalion management of Rearm, Refuel, Resupply, and Survey Point (R3SP) operations.

PROBLEMS:
1. Field artillery battalions do not normally properly plan, prepare, and execute Rearm, Refuel, Resupply, and Survey Point (R3SP) operations.
2. Battalion staffs identify R3SP requirements but do not integrate or synchronize the operation with the tactical plan.
3. A typical R3SP location is along the brigade MSR in an open field with no concealment and poor dispersion.

RESULTS:
1. The lack of discussion of R3SPs during the planning process causes poor site selection and unsynchronized execution within the battalion movement plan and logistics plan.
2. Poor or untimely ammunition guidance from the S3, and the lack of an effective timeline and/or trigger impedes the S4's effort to consolidate the necessary R3SP assets (Class III [B], V, survey, and LOGPAC if available) at the correct time and location.
3. An R3SP often turns into a refuel operation or unit distribution effort because of inadequate triggers.
4. The required equipment and assets, although available, are not postured forward to execute an R3SP.
5. Poor coordination between unit advance parties and the R3SP site OIC causes delays and confusion during the operation.

Techniques:
1. R3SP mission: The R3SP's principle mission is rearm and refuel the battalion with secondary missions of providing survey update for the M109A6 and linking up LOGPAC vehicles (if possible) or required unit supplies.
2. The S4 integrates and synchronizes the execution of the R3SP with the battalion's tactical plan.
    - The S4 should position the R3SP site central to the Paladin position areas to facilitate rapid execution.
    - It must be tactically positioned with good concealment, as survivability is a primary consideration for site selection.
    - Maximize terrain for cover and concealment and ensure good dispersion of assets.
3. The S3 provides guidance (ammunition types and powders) to the S4 with sufficient time for the battalion logisticians to execute the plan.
    - The S4, considering battery ammunition statuses, remaining mission requirements (estimate) and the battalion's on hand ammunition, gives guidance to the Battalion Ammunition Officer (BAO) who in turn begins configuring ammunition.
    - The BAO should focus on configuring pure PLS loads of killer ammunition with the correct powders. Special munitions (i.e. FASCAM or smoke) can be linked up with the appropriate unit at the R3SP or in the unit location.
    - The BAO notifies the S3 and units what is available at the R3SP to include ammunition types.
 4. The Ammunition Platoon Sergeant configures the R3SP in the field trains and possibly stages it in a forward location.
    - Crisis Action Team (CAT) assets are for emergency resupply during the battle and should not be used, but if they are used they must be resupplied, reconfigured or replaced immediately.
    - Ensure all assets are assembled early enough to conduct a rehearsal.

5. The R3SP site layout should facilitate rapid execution.

    - Establish an entry point, track plan, multiple ammunition upload lanes, by-pass lanes for vehicles not requiring ammunition, refuel points with survey control points, and a LOGPAC/supply linkup point at the exit.

    - Each element within the R3SP should maintain tactical dispersion.

    - The R3SP site should be set up to maximize the use of the multiple assets and be able to conduct multiple operations simultaneously.

6. The S4, CAT commander or BAO should be the R3SP site OIC and be responsible for site reconnaissance, conduct communications check, and establishing the R3SP prior to units arriving.

    - The R3SP OIC ensures the site layout facilitates rapid execution of R3SP.

    - Batteries should upload howitzers from battery ammunition vehicles prior to arrival, thus minimizing vehicles that rearm at the R3SP.

    - Batteries should transload ammunition from battery ammunition resupply vehicles (PLS) to section FAASVs, again minimizing R3SP execution time. This also will reduce the ammunition burden on the R3SP assets.

7. The R3SP site OIC positions the refuel point after the rearm point allowing simultaneous operations: refueling howitzers while rearming ammunition vehicles.

    - The Recon Survey Officer establishes the survey control points at the refuel sites to facilitate simultaneous operations.

    - The S4 should position LOGPAC vehicles (if available) near the R3SP exit to linkup with their unit as they depart the R3SP site.

8. Include the R3SP in the battalion TACSOP.

    - The TACSOP must establish responsibilities, time lines, pre-R3SP advance party linkup checklist, security responsibilities, and a site layout diagram.

9. The R3SP is not the only resupply technique. It is, however, the most efficient method to rearm, refuel and resupply a battalion conducting a deliberate movement. A properly planned, prepared and executed R3SP is the combat multiplier necessary to allow the battalion to continue the fight uninterrupted.

(TA.7.5.2 Supply the Force)

TREND 17: Chemical Defense Equipment (CDE) requisitioning and tracking.

PROBLEMS:
1. Units poorly track on-hand and requisitioned CDE, and normally arrive in theater (NTC) without any idea of what they have.
2. When units deploy, they do not consider the threat when determining exactly what to bring.
3. Most units arrive with significant CDE shortages, and the Chemical Officer/NCO, S4, and the commander are not aware of these shortages.
4. There is zero tracking of CDE during the course of the campaign. Units rarely order replacements for CDE that has been used as a result of fighting on a dirty battlefield.

RESULT: Poor guidance before deployment and poor tracking at Home Station result in units not able to sustain operations on a contaminated battlefield.

(NOTE: Units often voice "lack of funding" as the primary reason that equipment is not on hand. Although limited funding is a viable issue at Home Station, it cannot be the excuse given for casualties brought on by chemical or biological agents on the battlefield.)

Techniques:
1. Chemical Officers/NCOs at all levels must visit their NBC rooms regularly.
2. Establish a program of quarterly inspections and reward the best NBC NCOs.
3. Have units submit their CDE reports with their unit status report (USR), and include:
    - MTOE
    - CTA 50-970 items
    - roll-ups of scheduled services
    - distinction between training and contingency stocks
    - identification of shelf-life issues
    - roll-ups of NBC PLL on-hand in the NBC rooms
4. Make CDE a part of the Logistics Review (LR) process. Identify:
    - deadlined items
    - due-in status
    - funds issues
    - maintenance advisory messages
    - new equipment fielding
5. Before operations, issue specific guidance in the deployment order on with exactly what the units are to deploy.
6. Consider the threat with respect to all three aspects of NBC.
7. During operations, include CDE in logistics reports or create a separate report for Chemical NCOs. Bottom line - the *Chemical NCO* must actively track the CDE at all levels, ensure equipment is on order, and track the status through unit S4s.

(TA.7.5.2.1 Request Supplies)

TREND 18: Ammunition Support Operations.

PROBLEMS:
1. Units often have great storage plans but execute them poorly once the ammunition begins arriving at the Field Ammunition Supply Point (FASP). This usually occurs because the plan, although good, is not disseminated to the soldiers who must execute it.
2. Missiles are often positioned so that the warhead is aimed at other ammunition pads instead of outside the FASP towards a hill mass.

RESULT: Increased compatibility/distance violations and ultimately more work for the unit as the ammunition must be repositioned.

Techniques:
1. Ammunition storage plans, as with all plans, must be disseminated to the lowest level responsible for its execution.
2. Storage operations should be a part of the unit's SOP and must be familiar to all members of the unit.

(TA.7.5.2.5 Store Supplies)

TREND 19: Forward Support Battalion (FSB) coordination of refueling operations.

PROBLEMS:
1. Forward Support Battalion (FSB) support operations officer (SPOs) do not look from line of departure (LD) backwards when planning to top off maneuver tankers after LOGPAC operations.
2. SPOs do not coordinate for refuel windows with supported units.
3. SPOs fail to establish a system to receive an updated fuel on-hand report from Company A prior to LD.

RESULTS:
1. Supported units show up at their convenience.
2. FSBs are not often able to achieve a 90% (green) status in their bulk fuelers at LD.

Techniques:
1. Establish post-LOGPAC windows that are rigidly enforced by the FSB SPO. Maneuver units must top off after LOGPAC operations and not at their convenience the next morning.
2. Main Support Battalions (MSBs) must push fuel at night, normally after units LOGPACs have returned and topped off (2200-0200 hours).
3. FSB SPOs must establish a disciplined reporting procedure with the Company A to constantly report maneuver unit top-off times to the SPO. At least one hour prior to LD, Company A should report to the support operations the current on-hand in bulk fuelers. This information should be briefed to the battalion commander at the pre-battle update.

(TA.7.5.2.8 Issue Supplies)

TREND 20: Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) and refugee control operations. Maneuver planners, CSS planners, and Military Police (MP) platoon leaders do not coordinate effectively in planning for EPW and refugee control operations.

PROBLEMS:
1. Planners seldom assess the affect which EPWs and refugees have on brigade operations.
2. EPW collecting points and refugee control points are planned as collocated operations, which is doctrinally incorrect, or are located at locations which do not provide for the best support of brigade missions.
3. MPs are not tasked with the control of such personnel, which produces a coordinating vacuum that leaves supporting units at a loss of what to do next when EPWs and refugees are under their control.
4. Direct support MP platoon leaders hesitate to employ their soldiers in such static missions. Thus, EPW operations are normally not trained to standard at MP Home Station units.

Techniques:
1. During the staff planning process, Brigade Combat Team (BCT) planners and MPs must plan the method of control for EPW and refugee operations.
   - Include the best locations for the EPW collecting point and refugee control point.
   - Plan evacuation routes.
2. Forward MP acceptance of EPWs from combat troops is a basic principle listed in FM 19-40, Enemy Prisoners of War, Civilian Internees and Detained Persons. This is normally conducted at forward collecting points.
3. Host nation support with respect to refugee control operations must be known and articulated in brigade orders. Establish forward collecting points to ensure that brigade commanders comply with the provisions of the Geneva Convention as soon as possible.
4. Proper planning can mitigate the "drag" effect EPWs and refugees have on maneuver and mobility.

(TA 7.7.1 Perform PW Operations)

COMMAND AND CONTROL BOS

(Trends are numbered sequentially for cross-reference and are <u>not</u> in any priority order.)

Positive Performance

TREND 1: Understanding of brigade CSS standard operating procedures (SOPs). Brigade SOPs for conduct of maintenance meetings, LOGSTAT reports, and CSS rehearsals have improved brigade combat team (BCT) CSS operations. The single most positive aspect is the depth of understanding on the part of all units. Personnel arrive at the maintenance meeting, for example, prepared to discuss details of support and status.

Procedure: Develop SOPs for the conduct of routine operations. Ensure dissemination of procedures two levels down. Rehearse SOP tasks as a part of Home Station train up.

(TA.4.1.1 Communicate Information)

TREND 2: Electronic Attack mission planning and execution. During electronic warfare (EW) mission planning and execution, improvement has been observed in tailoring electronic attack (EA) missions to maneuver plans.

Techniques:
1. Reduce the number of EA missions, while also conducting EA missions that produce the most effects.
2. *Do not* conduct saturation jamming of OPFOR nets. The OPFOR will jump frequencies and generally work through the jamming. This is counterproductive to the overall intelligence effort because the limited EW systems available in brigades do not allow EA and voice collection missions to be conducted simultaneously. RESULT: When EA missions are conducted in this more specific manner, the brigade benefits from good voice collection operations, and more voice collection contributes to a more situationally aware brigade.
3. Sustain Home Station training where Analysis and Control Teams (ACTs) interact with brigade planners. The ability to conduct good EA missions is most prevalent when EW planners have a thorough understanding of both the potential threat and the supported brigade.

(TA.4.5 Employ Tactical C^2W)

Needs Emphasis

TREND 1: Transcription and Analysis (TA) team battle tracking.

PROBLEMS:
1. Most TA teams and Analysis Control Teams (ACTs), are unable to share a common picture of events on the battlefield. This lack of situational awareness makes it difficult for the TA team to keep their subordinate Electronic Warfare teams informed and synchronized with operations.
2. The TA team misses triggers for planned Electronic Attack missions and fails to trigger Electronic Support (ES) operations to answer PIRs. This condition is more pronounced in ACTs that are unsure of their role and responsibilities vice the TA team.

Techniques:
1. The ACT and the TA team need to get together and develop a *thorough SOP* that clearly identifies roles and responsibilities of each element.
   - identify what type of information the TA team requires and how often information is required to keep EW teams adequately informed.
   - use a battle tracking checklist as a guide in this process.
2. Include the exchange of battle tracking information as part of staff battle drills in CPXs at Home Station. This will require that *the TA team participate in exercises with the ACT* and the Brigade that it supports at Home Station.

(TA.4.1.3 Maintain Information and Force Status)

TREND 2: Maintain information on friendly unit locations. Military Police (MP) teams are victims of an excessive number of near fratricide situations.

PROBLEM: MP teams are encountering near fratricide situations involving MP contact with other brigade combat team (BCT) units, and even MP internal situations. These encounters normally occur during low visibility conditions and are a direct result of poor information dissemination during orders issue and information updates.

Techniques:
1. Platoon leaders must provide detailed information to subordinates on friendly unit locations.
2. MP Squad and Team Leaders must seek information and report unit locations/movements when conducting patrol operations.
3. Train these techniques to standard at Home Station to increase situational awareness and improve force protection:
   - Ensure subordinate leaders maintain updated graphics on overlays.
   - Ensure that MP teams are aware of all missions that the platoon is conducting.
   - Follow/establish far and near recognition (commo, visual) signals to be used when approaching units.
   - When appropriate, use established challenging procedures.
   - Establish engagement criteria for hostile situations.
   - Know the Air Defense Warning and Weapons Control Status.
   - Ensure soldiers are trained on threat vehicle and aircraft recognition.
   - When feasible, use pre-announcement procedures when making contact with units.

(TA.4.1.3 Maintain Information and Force Status)

TREND 3: Brigade command post (CP) battle tracking. Battle Tracking in Brigade Command Post too often fails to function in terms of how they perform actions, make decisions, and provide recommendations to the commander.

PROBLEM: Brigades are weak in battle tracking of combat power two levels down. The brigade believes that by tracking the task force combat power (one level down) they can stay abreast of the situation enough to monitor the battle. In order for the main CP to become a proactive participant in the fight it must know what is happening at the company/team level (two levels down). Additionally, the fighting of the deep fight, not in terms of distance, but time, requires the company/team details.

Techniques:
1. The brigade main CP must know the situation at the front
> - who is in contact
> - how much combat power remains
> - status of ammunition
> - who needs to come out of the fight to refuel, etc. to be able to make decision and
recommendations to the commander on
> - who gets priority of fires
> - where to commit the reserve
> - where to put CAS
> - what critical CSS assets need to be moving and where
2. FM 71-3 identifies 11 task for the brigade main CP to perform. Seven of these require detailed level of information.
> - Assist the brigade and task force commanders
> - Plan future operations
> - Coordinate operations throughout the depth of the AO
> - Synchronize CS and CSS assets
> - Monitor the close fight
> - Maintain continuous operations for extended periods
> - Assume command and control if the TAC is destroyed.
3. The building and tracking of combat power must be a units SOP for training as well as for deployment.
4. JANIS exercises must stress brigade main CP to track this level of detail and demand that they become an active player in employment of CAS, artillery, reserve forces, to include tracking and informing the commander of impending decision points, critical friendly and enemy events and the movement and priority of CS and CSS support throughout the brigade sector.
5. Brigade mains need standard tracking charts and SOP reports that include subordinate leaders using proper spot reports, commander SITREPs, BDA, and current combat power. With an established SOP for use of the Command and O/I frequencies, this level of information can be passed quickly without tying up the nets during the fight.

(TA.4.1.3 Maintain Information and Force Status)

TREND 4: Battle Command.

PROBLEM:
1. TF staffs/CPs do not effectively battletrack during the planning and preparation phases of an operation.
2. TF TOCs setup during the plan and prep for combat do not have a central nerve cell or an established tracking system to ensure critical tasks, events, or information are tracked.

RESULT:
1. Information is not shared, disseminated, and tracked by all the BOS elements.
2. Critical information concerning R&S effort and "hard" intelligence passed from brigade often never reached the hands of the S-3, Battle Captain or other BOS elements.
3. Commander's critical information requirements (CCIR) items are not proactively tracked inhibiting the staffs ability to accurately visualize the status of the TF to the commander in their preparation.

Techniques:
1. TF TOCs should establish a central node, similar to the one used during the fight and track the preparation for combat and re-prioritize efforts (Battle Command-Seeing Ourselves).
2. Effective battle tracking begins with the establishment of the TF timeline prior to mission analysis and the development of CCIR that must be tracked .
3. Units should develop SOPs for standardized missions during home station and implement or modify these tracking requirements based on METT-T.
4. CALL Newsletter 95-7 (Tactical Operations Center) provides some examples of standardized tracking methods and techniques.
5. The chief of staff must identify what information to track, establish how it will be tracked, and monitor his staff sections. The commander should be able to go to one source inside the TOC and quickly visualize the status of his TF in preparation for combat operations.

(TA. 4.1.3 Maintain Information and Force Status)

TREND 5: Medical company command post (CP) battle tracking. Medical company commanders do not have the necessary situational awareness, both tactically and technically, to command the brigade's medical resources.

PROBLEMS:
1. Medical company commanders often do not know what their CP's responsibilities are.
2. Many medical command posts are nothing more than a soldier on radio watch.

Techniques:
1. The medical company commander should develop a system to capture the critical information that needs to be available to him regularly. The information to track may include:
- maintenance status of the company's vehicles, and those of supported units
- critical medical equipment readiness
- on-hand balance of critical Class VIII items, for the company and for supported units
- status of critical general supplies, and orders for supplies that are due in
- current tactical situation
2. Place the information on boards that are hung along the walls of the CP to facilitate quick visual reference.
3. Tracking the medical company's resources and the tactical situation are essential for situational awareness and accurate decisions on the placement of medical assets in the brigade area.

(TA 4.1.3 Maintain Information and Force Status)

TREND 6: Fire support battle tracking and situation awareness to reduce fratricide risk.

PROBLEM: In almost every case of indirect fire *fratricide* at task force and company levels, the observers failed to plot no-fire areas (NFAs) or update the forward line of own troops (FLOT) on their maps.

Techniques:
1. Ensure that accurate battle tracking is maintained before and during the battle.
2. Implement an all-station net call prior to execution to exchange information and verify NFAs.
3. During the battle, company/team fire support teams (FISTs) need to come up on the net to update the FSO so everyone else can hear what is going on and track unit locations.

(TA.4.2.1 Review Current Situation)

TREND 7: Planning for Class IV barrier material.

PROBLEMS:
1. Units do not plan for and forecast Class IV, barrier material based on anticipated requirements.
2. Units fail to include required Class IV in load plans and movement calculations.
3. Leaders do not supervise and inspect protective obstacles.

RESULTS:
1. Units do not have sufficient material to construct required protective obstacles based on METT-T or their internal tactical standing operating procedure (TACSOP).
2. Obstacles are seldom constructed to standard in the required place.

Techniques:
1. Routine barrier material planning should be based on requirements established in the unit TACSOP.
    - The TACSOP requirement should be developed from the type, size, and number of obstacles each unit is expected to routinely erect.
    - Adjustments to the routine TACSOP Class IV requirements be made according to METT-T and the commanders assessment.
2. FM 5-102, appendix D stipulates about one 2 2 ton truck load of material for 300 meters of triple stand concertina.
3. Limited transportation assets and manpower for construction of obstacles may dictate that barriers be used to canalize enemy forces rather than provide perimeter security.
4. Leaders must define the standard for emplacement of obstacles, communicate the standard (TACSOP), and enforce the standard.

(TA.4.2.2 Project Future Requirements)

TREND 8: Contingency planning for advancing through templated persistent chemical (PCHEM).

PROBLEM: Brigades will template PCHEM and then plan their axis of advance or a battle position (BP) right through or in the middle of it without any concern for its effects on their scheme of maneuver.

RESULTS:
1. Initial or planned schemes of maneuver prove to be inflexible.
2. Increased delays when units encounter the contamination, thus causing additional attrition to a stagnant force.
3. Units must assume MOPP Level 4 in response to the attack when they could have avoided it all together.

Techniques:
1. If a route or BP is so critical to the selected course of action (COA) that it will not be changed, at least develop contingency routes and actions based upon the location of the templated PCHEM. Contingency routes can be as easy as selecting on-order routes based upon confirmation of the template by the S2.
2. Key to success is situational awareness of how the new routes will effect the scheme of maneuver and a discussion of those contingencies.
3. Contingency actions can include, but are not limited to:
  - increase MOPP level
  - ensure M8A1 alarms are employed
  - pre-inspect NBC equipment
  - pre-position battalion decontamination assets

(TA.4.2.3 Decide on Need for Action or Change)

TREND 9: Engineer force development of decision points for changing situations. Engineer commanders and staffs do not consistently develop decision points with supporting criteria to ensure continued support to the brigade in a fluid environment.

PROBLEM: In nearly every brigade mission there are both opportunities and requirements to change the task and purpose of engineer units with a corresponding change in task organization and/or change in priorities. While commanders and staffs cannot anticipate all these situations, the tendency is to issue an incomplete and inadequately synchronized fragmentary order during execution vice addressing the most likely contingencies during the initial planning process.

RESULT: The fragmentary order method usually results in a loss of momentum at the brigade level and difficulties in command, control, and support to the executing unit.

Techniques:
1. Commanders and staffs must develop clear decision points with a pre-established plan to accomplish the identified task as part of the brigade decision-making process to allow subordinate units to plan, prepare and execute the mission to standard.
2. Identify the requirement during planning.
3. Tie the required adjustment to a decision point with both friendly and enemy criteria.
4. Establish a command and control framework to execute.
5. Addressing the following potential situations during brigade level course of action development and synchronize the adjustment with required command and control plan during wargaming:
   - Transition from task force to brigade deliberate breach operations.
   - Culmination of lead task force with follow and assume/support task force becoming the main effort.
   - Loss of engineers in the breach force.
   - Success of lead task force in breaching main defensive belt causing future mobility requirements at the existing breach site to be in support of brigade level maneuver.
   - Adjusting the SCATMINE system allocation based upon success or failure of the conventional effort.
   - Transferring blade assets and platoons from one unit sector to another.
   - Ending brigade level CM/S effort to initiate task force level effort.
   - Disengaging engineer units and assets.
   - Changing type of survivability positions based on progress.

(TA.4.2.3 Decide on Need for Action or Change)

TREND 10: Predictive analysis. The main CP is often not able to provide the TF commander with a predictive analysis during the fight.

PROBLEMS: The main CP does not consistently:
1. Analyze information received.
2. Provide the commander with an estimate of what the enemy will do next.
3. Recommend future friendly actions.

RESULT: The commander does not receive predictive analysis from his CP.

Techniques:
1. TF XO, S-2, S-3 Air, and FSE need to *track the battle at the main CP map board and "think one step ahead"* of both enemy and friendly forces.
        - they need to delegate routine administrative duties to others in their sections as much as possible.
        - they should also eliminate unnecessary functions from their sections and even the CP itself.
2. Battle Staff regularly provide the commander with predictive analysis products and recommendation(s) based upon those products for future actions:
        - event matrix
        - updated situation template
        - decision support matrix

(TA.4.2.3 Decide on Need for Action or Change)

TREND 11: Brigade planning for multiple enemy courses of action (COAs). Brigade plans are normally based on a single anticipated enemy COA.

PROBLEMS:
1. Brigade staffs often plan their scheme of maneuver against a single anticipated enemy rather than branch planning to develop a flexible scheme that would be effective against a range of enemy options.
2. Brigades that do some branch planning often do not include the same staff as for the base plan.

RESULTS:
1. Inflexible execution when the enemy reacts differently than anticipated.
2. Does not provide the maneuver commander the necessary flexibility to adjust the brigade's plan; we often fight the plan, not the enemy.
3. Synchronization of the force is often unhinged when required to react to unplanned "push-to-talk" operations.
4. Uncoordinated effort.

Techniques:
1. Address multiple enemy COAs *early* in the planning process to allow each BOS to synchronize and plan to support the development of decision points and triggers to defeat an uncooperative enemy.
2. Although the result of branch planning is not often a written product (CONPLAN), it should result in graphic control measures to facilitate its rapid execution based on the commander's decision.
3. Brigade plans must be flexible and address multiple enemy COAs.
4. Develop standard "plays" at Home Station that are well rehearsed by subordinate units to provide a foundation for execution of base plans. Time during the planning process can then be spent on development of branches and sequels of the base plan.
5. The revision and supervision phases of troop leading procedures must be utilized by the commanders and staff to build on decision points and sequels based on intelligence gathering and changing situations. Simply, the planning process and staff responsibilities do *not* end with issuing the order.

(TA.4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 12: Integration of target analysis into the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP). Brigade Combat Team (BCT) target analysis and synchronization meetings are often not linked to the entire planning process.

RESULT: Brigade is unable to determine the High Payoff Targets (HPTs) and how and when to best attack them.

Techniques:
1. S2s begin the process *before* mission analysis and use Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) and Target Value Analysis (TVA) to identify HPTs within the enemy formation and why they are important to that formation. In other words, *identify enemy vulnerabilities*.
2. The Fire Support Officer (FSO), Assistant Brigade Engineer (ABE), and other battlefield operating systems must assist the S2 in this process.
3. The Brigade Commander provides additional guidance and focuses the effort as he gives his intent for fires and maneuver.
4. The FSO must then sequence available assets to find and attack the HPTs to meet the Commander's guidance - the Concept of Fires.
5. The concept of fires is then included into each course of action (COA) and is developed into a detailed scheme of fires during wargaming.

(TA.4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 13: Brigade planning for Combat Observation Lasing Team (COLT) operations.
Planning for COLT operations at the brigade level remains an overall weakness.

PROBLEMS:
1. While the brigade assigns COLTs R&S responsibilities, the brigade planning does not address in detail their mission, infiltration, and extraction.
2. Instead of a staff effort, the planning for COLT operations to plan these critical areas are left to the COLT platoon leader and the R&S planner to plan, prepare, and execute.

NOTE: Individual skills of Combat Observation Lasing Teams (COLTs) have *improved* during this quarter. Teams continue to improve their *survival* skills (fieldcraft) and *tactical knowledge* in movement techniques, *camouflage*, *reporting*, and knowledge of the *enemy*.

Techniques:
1. Brigade staff planning must include:
 - how the COLTs will conduct a forward passage of lines
 - routes
 - resupply operations
 - communication requirements for retrans operations
 - insertion operations by ground and air
 - casualty evacuation
2. The COLTs exist to support the brigade's fight and their employment requires the integrated and synchronized planning efforts of the entire brigade staff.
3. Planning for COLT operations begins as early as high value targets are identified and refined as course of action is developed and finalized during the wargaming. Suggested areas for staff planning:
 - S2. Determine the requirements for COLTs. Identify target areas of interest and named areas of interest for the purpose of providing intel and destroying high payoff targets.
 - S2/Engineer. Conduct a terrain analysis to identify possible observation posts by using Terrabase and the expertise of the staff.
 - S3. Allocate resources for the mission (Air Force ETACs/SAPPERs/IEW personnel/aircraft/scout augmentees for security/additional communications equipment/UAV. etc.). Plan for the insertion/extraction. Plan like any other operation to include determining infiltration methods, plan routes, checkpoints, pickup, landing zones, false insertions, forward and rearward passage of lines, and emergency resupply. Make coordination for aircraft, retrans vehicles, and terrain management.
 - S4. Support the infiltration/extraction. Plan resupply, casualty evacuation, and if applicable caches.
 - FSO/COLT platoon leader. Prepare order, backbriefs to the commander, conduct PCCs/PCIs, and rehearsals.
 - S2/S3/FSO. Execution - provide staff supervision until the mission is complete.

(TA.4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 14: Decontamination planning at Task Force level.

PROBLEMS:
1. Task Forces (TFs) do minimal planning for Operational Decontamination.
2. Most TFs have the M17 SANATOR that enables them to conduct Operational Decon, but seldom consider its use to aid them in sustaining their combat power.
3. Communication with the M17 crew is *nonexistent*, and the crew is usually in the BSA or combat trains.
4. There is often no water plan to support the Operational Decontamination; no consideration is given whether to use available assets from the TF, or request to higher for support.
5. Selection of possible link-up points and C2 issues are *never* planned.

Procedure: Chemical Staffs must *plan* for Operational Decontamination.

(TA.4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 15: Brigade XO roles and responsibilities in the brigade battle staff. The Brigade XO is often a dysfunctional participant of the brigade battle staff.

PROBLEMS:
1. Before deployment to NTC: During train-up at Home Station, brigade commanders fail to clearly identify the roles and responsibilities of the brigade XO and how he is to work with the Bde S3.
    - Brigade XOs tends not to be involved in the training of the orders process until a major training event occurs (FCX, JANIS).
    - The orders process train-up does not stress synchronization and execution of all BOS elements.
    - No Chief-of-Staff is required to track brigade execution from the initiation of mission analysis to mission completion.
    - Although the S3 assumes some of this function, he is never required to truly synchronize logistics with fire and maneuver during most JANIS and FCX training events.
RESULT: The unit deploys to the NTC without a clear picture of the roles and requirements of the brigade XO.
2. After deployment to NTC: The XO begins to execute his responsibility as Chief-of-Staff for the commander without a clear working relationship with the S3 and no clear areas of responsibility other than "the XO keeps the time clock and worries about CSS."
    - As the orders process progresses, the S3 and Cdr. get involved with the maneuver and wargaming and do not sufficiency integrate the BOS elements into a cohesive and functional plan.
    - The XO is caught up with:
        -- moving and sustaining a real force in a hostile environment
        -- working with TOC personnel who mostly work for the S3
        -- trying to observe and integrate what he can of the BOS into an order that the S3 and commander are doing, on their own, in the plans tent.
    - Any attempt by the XO to maintain a time clock is seen as abrasive, and is resisted by both S3 and commander.
RESULT: The order fails to synchronize the BOS, fails to consider any sort of TLP timeline for the task forces, and is executed from the brigade main CP by an XO that knows very little about the plan.

3. Around the time of the third orders process: The commander finally understands that somebody has to be the Chief-of-Staff for the orders process.

      - The commander is too busy and the S3 is only focused on maneuver and cannot step back to see the big picture.

      - The XO begins to find his niche. With all the staff reporting to him as the center of the brigade operations, he can begin to integrate all BOS elements into the plan.

      - The S3 is now free to concentrate on his parts of the operation and the commander can get out of the TOC and see his troops.

RESULT: This is a slow learning process for the XO, but with practice, the brigade's orders process gets on the right track.

4. Response to lower operational readiness (OR) rate: Unfortunately, as the learning curve for the brigade XO and the battle staff begins a steady climb, the brigade OR rate heads in the other direction.

      - Right at the time when the orders process has a chance to jell, the brigade XO is pulled out and sent to the BSA to become an over-grown BMO.

      - The battle staff, now under control of the S3, drops all concepts of integration and logistical synchronization.

      - The commander, feeling the pressure of maintenance, increased tempo of the rotation, and the lack of a Chief-of-Staff, turns off any growth in the orders process and conducts self preservation. The commander says, "No new ideas on how to do orders. We do just what we trained at home station - S3 get me an order out as fast as possible - we will work the details at the rehearsal".

      - The XO is now living in the BSA. Whatever growth the maintenance management system has been through over the last few days is terminated. The XO says, "No new ideas on how we do maintenance. We do just what we trained at home station - task force XOs give me your deadline report; we are going to start cross leveling, circle-xing, and scrounging parts".

RESULTS:

1. Any systems established, developed, or grown during the rotation do not get a chance to mature.

2. The unit leaves at the end of the rotation with a lot of knowledge and ideas of how to do things better, but no ideas or experience on how to make it work.

3. The orders process and maintenance system are broken and stay broken.

4. The brigade returns home to pass on to the next rotational unit "how to win at the NTC", and *nothing* to do with:

      - learning the orders process

      - developing and training a maintenance system that works

      - using the XO as the executive officer to the commander and performing his Chief-of-Staff function.

5. The XO is depicted as the commander's personal troubleshooter. He is in the way as a player in the orders process, and best kept at the BSA.

Techniques:
1. The brigade XO must be the right hand man to the commander with all the authority and responsibilities that position requires to execute. The brigade commander must clearly make the brigade XO the Chief-of-Staff for the brigade.
2. The S3 must work *for the XO in garrison as well as the field*.
3. During train-up, all elements of BOS must be stressed and integrated into every level of training.
      -- FCXs designed to stress and exercise logistical consideration must be trained.
      -- Logistics exercises must be executed by the full battle staff, to include S3.
4. The XO needs to be drilled by the brigade commander in the role of Chief-of-Staff to include heading up the orders process.
5. The FSB commander, task force XOs, and task force BMOs need to be held responsible for their jobs and should *not* have the brigade XO as their safety valve. (Part of the task force BMO's responsibility is developing and drilling a system of keeping the task force Chief-of-Staff informed of maintenance issues.)
6. Task force XO needs to maintain a system that keeps the brigade XO informed.
7. The BMOs needs to be trained <u>not</u> to make every meeting with the XO a decision meeting.
8. When maintenance becomes an issue at the NTC, *do not strip the Chief-of-Staff out of the task force and brigade* to try and put a bandage on the problem.
    - Give the O/Cs a chance to work with the maintenance staff to get them through the problem areas.
    - If the brigade is having that many problems in maintenance that the O/Cs cannot help, the FSB commander needs to be brought forward.
      -- The FSB and additional maintenance assets can surge on a task force to get OR up.
      -- Do not strip the front lines to fix the support elements.

(TA.4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 16: Task force S2 completion of products for the decision-making process.

PROBLEM: Task Forces often rush mission analysis, not giving the S2 time to complete his products.

RESULTS:
1. Task Force S2s normally brief only one enemy Course of Action (COA).
2. S2s often do not assist the rest of the battle staff in visualizing how the enemy will fight using all the combat multipliers and the terrain.

Techniques:
1. Battle staff must understand that mission analysis is one of the most important steps in the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP).
2. S2s must practice SITEMP drills at Home Station so the process can be completed in a timely fashion.
3. The Brigade S2 must produce and disseminate products to the Task Force early to allow parallel planning.

(TA. 4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 17: Engineer Integration in the Tactical Operations Center (TOC).

PROBLEMS:
1. Often the task force (TF) engineer plan is buried in an annex to the OPORD and does not get read by non-engineers; this can be disastrous when it includes specified tasks to non-engineer subordinate units.
2. Mobility and survivability tasks are not engineer unit specific.
3. Engineer tasks must be addressed in Paragraph 3, Execution, of the OPORD where all maneuver elements will see them.

RESULTS:
1. The engineer estimate mirrors the command estimate upon receipt of the mission.
2. The meat of the Scheme of Engineer Operations (SOEO)--the essential tasks derived from the higher unit maneuver operations order--must be in the TF OPORD.

Techniques:
1. The engineer plans cell integrates into the maneuver Tactical Operations Center (TOC) and its associated staff members, the higher engineer command, and the engineer company for combined support of the maneuver TF, this effort directly influences the quality of future plans and the effective execution of engineer operations.
2. The TF must allow the engineer planner to brief during both the mission analysis brief and the COA briefs so that critical mobility and survivability information is communicated to all elements of the TF.
3. The engineer estimate allows the engineer planner to integrate his company's capabilities as a combat multiplier into the TF's plan.
4. The TF engineer makes sure that required engineer missions and instructions and constraints and limitations are included in the appropriate part of the TF OPORD (not buried in the engineer annex).
5. SOEO is refined during wargaming and is the basis for the engineer company order.

(TA. 4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 18: Command Post Site Location and Displacement.

PROBLEMS:
1. Command Post (CP) site location and displacement planning are not effectively integrated into the task force (TF) planning process.
2. TF TOC jump plans are not incorporated into the TF planning process.
RESULTS:
1. The Tactical Operations Center is unable to effectively command and control during critical points of the battle.
2. Command and control nodes cannot support the TF, maintain situational awareness and effectively conduct predictive analysis and timely recommendations to the commander.
Techniques:
1. During the planning process the battle staff must identify where the critical points on the battlefield will be located. This first step then allows the staff to backwards plan to determine where the TOC must be located at that point to facilitate command and control.
2. Triggers/decision points must then be developed to determine when the TOC moves to ensure that they are set during these critical points.
3. The TOC movement/displacement plan is not necessarily tied to the maneuver of the TF. The imperative is that it is set and ready to fight at these anticipated critical points.

(TA. 4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 19: Combat Health Support (CHS) planning.

PROBLEMS:
1. There is rarely a medical officer involved in the planning of brigade combat health support operations.
2. The medical planning and the S-1 are not considering the casualty estimate when developing the CHS plan.
3. The medical planner is not integrated into the brigade's Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP).

RESULTS:
1. The CHS plan for placement of medical assets on the battlefield
      - does not support the maneuver commander's plan
      - fails to take into consideration time/distance factors in the evacuation and treatment of casualties.
2. Insufficient evacuation platforms are at the right place and right time to support the casualties incurred.
3. Brigade's medical assets are not able to acquire, treat and evacuate casualties in time to prevent them from dying of wounds.

Techniques:
1. The Forward Support Medical Commander (FSMC) is currently the only technical expert available to the brigade. He must be included into the brigade's MDMP to ensure a technically sound plan that is synchronized with and integrated into the maneuver commander's plan.
      - This individual must bring to mission analysis the maintenance status of the brigades evacuation platforms and the status of Class VIII medical supplies and blood in the brigade.
      - The medical planner must have an understanding of the commander's intent and the course of action so that he/she is able to develop a medical support that supports the tactical plan.
      - The medical planner must be actively involved in the wargaming process to ensure that his/her plan ins synchronized and integrated with the rest of the BOS in the brigade.
2. The medical planner and the brigade S1 must look carefully at the casualty estimate and the S2's situational template (SITEMP) to determine the densities of casualties during the different phases of the operation.
      - They must determine the required number of evacuation platforms to move these casualties.
      - They must determine if there is a requirement for additional nonstandard platforms to assist in the evacuation process.
      - The requirement for additional assets is then integrated into the CHS Annex as a specified task to subordinate units.

(TA.4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 20: Forward Support Battalion (FSB) Executive Officer (XO) understanding of the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP). FSB XOs do not fully understand or properly implement the MDMP.

PROBLEMS:
1. Many FSB XOs are not aware that there are three methods of the MDMP, based on available planning time.
2. They have difficulty with the orders process because they do not fully understand the components of that process; the least understood area is the estimate of the situation.
3. Mission analysis is not conducted properly.
4. COA development and COA analysis is not conducted properly.

RESULTS:
1. Published orders are not coordinated and synchronized.
2. Typically, orders are published without a clear intent, no risk assessment, no BOS annexes, and no BOS overlays.

Techniques:
1. XOs must become knowledgeable of the MDMP using the following guides:
- ST 101-5
- FM 101-5
- CALL Newsletter 95-12.
2. XOs should inculcate the MDMP process in all training events to include CPX, FTX, and battle simulation exercises. Only by religiously using the MDMP will they develop the proficiency and expertise required to successfully execute this portion of their duties as an XO.

(TA.4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 21: Infantry team direct fire planning. Infantry teams have difficulty in direct fire planning and execution in both offensive and defensive operations.

PROBLEMS:
1. Unable to mass fires in engagement areas (EAs).
2. Unable to focus, distribute and shift fires in manners that are understood by the soldiers that are to execute the plan.
3. During preparations for defensive operations, teams have difficulty siting obstacles so that they exploit terrain conditions and the effects of direct fire weapons.

Techniques:
1. Obtain and use Infantry School *student handout* on direct fire planning, SH 7-45.
2. Incorporate SH 7-45 in future editions of FM 71-1, FM 71-2 and FM 71-123.
3. Incorporate training on direct fire planning in Home Station training.

(TA.4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 22: Integration of mission analysis. Mission analysis is *rarely conducted as an integrated Battle Staff function.*

PROBLEMS:
1. Battle Staff does not conduct parallel planning
   -Battle Staff assembles at task force (TF) command post (CP) while TF Commander, S-3, and FSO receive brigade order at brigade
   -Battle Staff does not conduct mission analysis of *respective BOSs*
2. Frequently, some members (CSS-related) are not even informed of receipt of the order and mission analysis.

RESULT: TF planning *does not fully identify specified, implied, and essential tasks* for brief to commander.

Techniques:
1. Battle Staff conduct mission analysis integrating all key planners.
2. Conduct mission analysis while others are at brigade CP; refine analysis upon their return, prior to writing the restated mission.

(TA.4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 23: Developing the Commander's intent. The Commander's intent as given at the conclusion of mission analysis is often vague, contradictory, or too complex.

Techniques:
1. Clear and concise planning guidance that addresses who, what, where, when, how, and why indirect fires will support the scheme of maneuver will effectively focus the concept for indirect fires.
2. Commander's intent should focus on critical events necessary to accomplish the mission. Include attack criteria and engagement criteria, priorities for target engagement, and guidance for special munitions.
3. Ensure all of the critical fire support tasks (CFSTs) are addressed in the scheme of fires. They must clearly communicate the commander's intent for fires as task, purpose, method, and end state.

(TA. 4.3.1 Issue Planning Guidance)

TREND 24: Task force development and refinement of courses of action (COA). Task force S3s and commanders struggle through COA development and refining the COA into a scheme of maneuver.
PROBLEMS:
1. Most S3's do not know how to start COA development.
2. Task forces normally develop COA's that only provide an axis, a formation and a simple plan for actions on the objective.
3. COAs normally do not include branches that provide flexibility to the plan based upon various possible situations.
4. COAs normally do not address details for actions on contact, actions on the objective nor continuous reconnaissance.
5. Clear tasks and purposes for subordinate units are not usually provided.
6. COAs are seldom refined during wargaming.
Procedure: Chapter 2, FM 7-20 is an excellent reference for developing a COA and scheme of maneuver. This chapter should be incorporated into future additions of FM 71-2 and FM 71-1.

(TA 4.3.2 Develop Courses of Action)

TREND 25: Task Force S3 understanding of course of action (COA) development.

PROBLEMS:
1. Task force S3s often do not develop COAs based on the commanders decisive point and are not able to define in doctrinal terms what they want the company/teams to do.
2. COA are frequently not developed with the S2's SITEMP or on a map where the terrain can be visualized.

Procedures:
1. Commanders and staffs should become familiar with Chapter 2 of FM 7-20 for development of COAs.
2. FM 101-5-1 provides the correct doctrinal definitions that should be used when assigning company/team tasks and purposes.

(TA.4.3.2 Develop Courses of Action)

TREND 26: Wargaming the CSS concept of support. The CSS concept of support most often focuses on maneuver unit COAs that begin with actions beyond the LD and culminate with action on objective. It seldom addresses support requirements for before and after the battle.

PROBLEMS:
1. During preparation for combat, the CSS concept of support seldom addresses such things as:
    - where the aid stations are located
    - how much fuel/ammo will be consumed during rehearsals
    - a description of replenishment or services for operations before the LD if the brigade combat team (BCT) is moving.
2. As the brigade enters the after-combat phase, the CSS annex once again does not outline a concept of support.

RESULTS:
1. With regard to the after-combat phase, specific replenishment and services tasks are not addressed in respect to transitioning to future operations.
2. The brigade's ability to identify a culminating point is diminished. For example, if the future planners determine a minimum of 80% combat power in order to defend against a counter attack, specific criteria must be addressed in the CSS annex to ensure rapid regeneration as well as keeping the commander informed if the combat team begins to approach 80%.

Techniques:
1. While the maneuver BOS focuses and wargames actions after the LD, the CSS community (planners) must wargame actions through all phases.
2. CSS wargaming cannot wait until the planning process formally addresses wargaming; rather, in the case of before operations, the CSS wargame must occur timely enough for the Forward Support Battalion (FSB) to react.

(TA.4.3.3 Analyze Courses of Action)

TREND 27: Wargaming. Wargaming rarely synchronizes the task force (TF) plan.

PROBLEMS:
1. Task force executive officers (TF XOs) do not facilitate the process:
    - staff loses focus on *critical events*
    - relationship between events wargamed and *decisive point*
2. Wargame takes too long

RESULTS:
1. Only most aggressive participants provide input.
2. Other participants write annexes without synchronizing their BOS.

Techniques:
1. TF XO or S-3 take charge of wargaming; keep wargame focused on:
    - critical events
    - decision point
2. Use *synchronization matrix to record events* wargamed by phase and BOS.
3. Use NTC "How To" video, *Wargaming,* to demonstrate "a way" to conduct the wargame process.

(TA.4.3.3 Analyze Courses of Action)

TREND 28: Tactical maneuver decision point development.

PROBLEMS:
1. Development of decision point criteria (e.g. PIR, NAI, event) is too often not a function of the wargame.
2. Decision point development:
    - lacks specific detail
    - is often ineffective in providing timely execution of critical decisions during the fight
    - are often made after line of departure (LD)
    - criteria based on a single anticipated enemy COA

RESULTS:
1. *Late or ineffective key decisions* are made to maneuver and fight a flexible enemy with multiple COAs.
2. Trigger point development is done while forces are maneuvering on the battlefield.
3. Commanders are forced to *react* to enemy actions, hampered in executing timely decisions, developing hasty COAs, and issuing FRAGOs.
4. With only one anticipated enemy COA, the flexibility of the brigade plan in hindered.

Techniques:
1. Staffs must develop decision point criteria for multiple enemy COAs.
2. This process should be ongoing during the refinement and supervision phases of the planning process.
3. Decision points must be a result of the wargame and based on a comparison of multiple enemy COAs.

(TA.4.3.3 Analyze Courses of Action)

TREND 29: Main Command Post standard operating procedures (SOP) for movement.

PROBLEMS:
1. Units do not have SOPs that establish priority of work during setup and tear down.
2. Main Command Posts (CPs) seldom have a REDCON system that helps posture the CP for movement based on mission requirements or increased enemy threat. The Main CP consists of two major functional areas:
      - the CP and operational support assets
      - the Life Support Area (LSA)

RESULT: Units are often ham-strung when it comes time to move.

Techniques:
1. Units should establish a simple REDCON level associated with the level and priority of work required based on the current METT-T of the situation.
EXAMPLE:
      REDCON 1 - Ready to move /TOC broken down / march columns lined up.
      REDCON 2 - TOC ready to move in 15 Mins / RED TOC configuration / working off vehicle antennas / M-8 alarms out /
      REDCON 3 - TOC ready to move in 1 hr / Green TOC / antennas up / Life Support Area packed up / M8 Alarms out / no camouflage up / Quartering party departed to new site.
      REDCON 4 - TOC ready to move in 2 hrs / Green TOC / antennas up / LSA up / camouflage up / M8 Alarms out.
2. This system will help establish priority of work when the unit pulls into a new site. The TOC goes from REDCON 1 to REDCON 3 and then based on duration of stay drops to a REDCON 4 status with full LSA up.
3. When the situation requires the main to move:
      - The first break is the LSA, which brings you to REDCON 3 and the Quartering Party is ready to or is kicked out to new site. A modification to this is when you drop the Main's camouflage net.
      - REDCON 2 is a HOT TOC configuration with all major work completed but TOC is still functional. A course of action could be to kick the LSA vehicles out to the new site and link up with the Q-party.
      - Go to REDCON 1 would mean break and march column. Ready to move.

NOTE: This system was used during Desert Storm and was very effective. The Main CP was able to manage their personnel assets to remain functional until the last minute before jumping, and all personnel understood their priority of work once at the new site. When the division jumped into Iraq the D-Main never left the REDCON 3 configuration, and was ready to move in one hour notice. With the command "Go to REDCON 2", every section had developed their own drills to achieve that level of readiness. With every jump, there was very little decision- making required by key leaders as to what needed to be done. Soldiers did not stand around waiting to be told what to do.

(TA.4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)

TREND 30: Engineer battalion command and control. Engineer battalion command and control of all organic and supporting engineer units within the brigade combat team (BCT) is typically inconsistent.

PROBLEMS:
1. During heavy/light NTC rotations, BCT engineer battalion commanders and staffs often lack involvement in, and visibility of engineer support to the Light Infantry task force (TF) and the Combat Support Equipment (CSE) platoons attached to them for mobility/survivability support.
2. There is inconsistent situational awareness at BCT level of mobility/countermobility/ survivability operations across entirety of the Brigade to include the Light TF.
3. Unclear command/support relationships exist between the light engineer platoon and mechanized Engineer PLTs task organized to the Light TF. "Who's in charge?" is a routinely voiced question.
4. Unclear BCT engineer commander's guidance is given to the Light Engineer platoon leader.
5. Combat Support Equipment (CSE) platoons are not consistently integrated into the battalion's troop leading procedures.
6. CSE platoons rarely receive WARNOs, FRAGOs or OPORDs.

Techniques:
1. According to FM 5-71-3, the engineer battalion commander is the Brigade Engineer and principal advisor to the brigade commander. If not commanding, he should help direct all engineer forces controlled by or supporting the brigade.
2. The Brigade Engineer must clearly establish who has responsibility as staff engineer of all maneuver TFs of the BCT.
3. The Brigade Engineer must review/develop command, control and communications to ensure the brigade engineer section has required information and coordination capability across the entire Brigade.
4. Engineer Battalion must improve development of concept of operation and sub-unit tasks for internally-controlled assets in order to set a sound and timely basis for lower level troop leading procedures.

(TA.4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)

TREND 31: Defining the role of the Field Artillery battalion liaison officer (LNO).

PROBLEMS:
1. The role of the liaison officer (LNO) is not defined.
2. There is seldom an established list of requirements for the LNO in the unit tactical SOP (TACSOP).
3. While at the supported unit tactical operations center (TOC), LNOs have not facilitated information exchange between units.
4. Units seldom have established expectations or lists of duties for the LNO to follow during the battle. When they are established, the LNO section do not routinely follow them.

RESULT: The LNO does not know what his unit requires or when it is required.

Techniques:
1. The LNO plays a critical role in the information exchange between the direct support (DS) battalion TOC and the reinforcing (R) or general support-reinforcing (GS-R) TOC. He represents his unit in the DS TOC. He must update his unit on the DS unit's current situation and any future plans, and keep the DS unit informed on his unit's situation and capabilities. This is especially critical when the DS and R/GS-R units are unlike systems. The LNO may have to pull information from the DS unit and push it to his unit in a timely manner.
2. The LNO's duties and requirements must be clearly established in the unit's TACSOP.
    - The S3 must enforce these requirements during the battle.
    - The S3 should develop a specific list of information requirements and periodic reports.
    - FM 6-20-1 and FM 6-60 describe the duties of the liaison officer and section. (Appendix E, FM 6-60, contains a good MLRS battalion LNO checklist, that can be modified to meet the requirements of a cannon battalion LNO.)
3. The unit TACSOP should include, but not be limited to, the following:
    - LNO to R/GS-R TOC
        -- DS battalion critical fire support tasks
        -- DS battalion critical events timeline
        -- DS unit locations and scheme of movement
        -- Radar deployment order
        -- Periodic situation reports
        -- Fire support coordination measures
        -- Communication net structure, call signs and digital addresses
        -- Artillery intelligence (RAG/DAG locations)
        -- Maneuver situation updates
    - R/GS-R TOC to the LNO, LNO to DS TOC
        -- R/GS-R battalion critical fire support tasks
        -- R/GS-R battalion scheme of fires
        -- R/GS-R critical events timeline
        -- R/GS-R unit locations and scheme of movement
        -- Radar zone refinement (if applicable)
        -- Artillery intelligence (RAG/DAG locations)
        -- Periodic situation reports

(TA.4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)

TREND 32: Medical company troop leading procedures. Medical leaders seldom use established troop leading procedures and field orders to ensure timely execution of their plans.

RESULT: On numerous occasions the ambulance platoon deploys to an Ambulance Exchange Point (AXP) in the *dark,* and *after* the brigade has started its reconnaissance/counterreconnaissance battle.

Technique: Use FM 71-1 and FM 7-8 as references to train and implement established procedures at Home Station. This will improve leaders' ability to manage their time and provide subordinates with the information needed prior to start of mission. Use of established procedures will facilitate the early movement of ambulance platoons when the company commanders have not completed their orders.

(TA.4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)

TREND 33: Medical company Tactical Standard Operating Procedures (TACSOP). Over 90 percent of the medical companies deploying to the NTC do not have a company TACSOP.

RESULTS:
1. Company leadership does not clearly understand their role and responsibilities in a field environment.
2. Leaders duplicate work and critical leader tasks do not get accomplished effectively, if at all.
3. Critical tasks are done differently each time, and take longer, since no one knows the standards for completion.

Technique: Develop and distribute a TACSOP that clearly articulates the roles and responsibilities for each leader within the company. Use established medical doctrine and mission training plans as sources for identification of these tasks.
- write to the job, not to the personality of the person in the job.
- identify each critical task the company must accomplish to be combat ready.
- describe how the task is done, and include an established time standard for completion.

(TA.4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)

TREND 34: CSS Company commander support of the reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) plan.

PROBLEM: CSS Company commanders fail to support the S2/S3 when the R&S plan is issued, even when specified tasks were provided. LP/OPs are often not in place or, if emplaced, lack the necessary equipment or the knowledge to conduct the mission.

RESULT: The OPFOR mounts raids and enters the BLUFOR Brigade Support Area (BSA) with continued success.

Techniques:
1. The S2/S3 section should periodically check LP/OP positions confirming the R&S plan.
2. The commander should have a set of established responsibilities outlined in the Tactical Standard Operating Procedures (TACSOP) specifically focusing on an intelligence collection plan.
3. The FSB commander should define, communicate, train, and enforce the standard.

(TA.4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)

TREND 35: Control of engineer operations in the Forward Support Battalion.

PROBLEM: The FSB rarely has a single person in charge of the engineering effort, giving priorities and passing the asset from one unit to the other.

RESULT: The strongest NCO or officer takes the engineers and keeps them all day.

Techniques:
1. Designate a commander-in-chief, i.e., CSM, or a strong NCO to control engineers.
2. Develop an engineer matrix. Establish disciplined priorities for engineer support.
3. Identify exactly where the engineer digging assets to go and in what order they are to complete their projects.

(TA.4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)

TREND 36: Battalion maintenance officer (BMO) troop leading procedures. Troop leading procedures are not used effectively in the unit maintenance collection point (UMCP).

PROBLEMS:
1. No mission analysis conducted.
2. No effective or timely OPORDs issued.
3. No timelines established.

Techniques:
1. The BMO must consciously train himself and subordinate leaders in the application of the troop leading procedures.
2. Focus Home Station training on what happens in the UMCP when the mission is received, when and how OPORDs are issued, and how time is managed.

(TA.4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)

TREND 37: Management of Timelines.

PROBLEMS:
1. TF staffs/CPs do not effectively manage a TF timeline.
2. The inability to manage a written timeline combined with staff sections completing required products in a timely manner.

RESULTS:
1. Critical events fail to take place, and TF actions hinder troop leading procedures at subordinate levels and ultimately prevents the TF from seeing itself in preparation for combat.
2. The TF staff does not have enough time to adequately wargame the selected COA.
3. This caused the orders to lack focus on killing the enemy at the decisive point and often lead to an unclear tasks and purpose to subordinate leaders.

Techniques:
1. The TF timeline should be developed early in the planning process and then continually updated throughout the process.
2. The initial timeline should include the staff's planning cycle, critical R&S activities, and company/team troop leading procedures (e.g., boresighting, initial movement times etc.).
3. As the planning process continues, additional operational critical events are also added to the timeline and continued throughout the wargame process.
4. Key events off of the synchronization matrix should also be incorporated into the timeline. This allows critical tasks to be tracked throughout the battle and provides a valuable tool.
5. Upon completion of the planning process the staff should collate the data onto a butcher board and briefed as part of the TF OPORD.
6. The timeline the staff should include critical TLPs to be conducted at the company/team level. These should include company/team OPORD times, rehearsals, boresight, and LOGPAC.
7. These requirements are not intended to micro-manage co/tms but rather to provide them a common base to begin their planning and preparation. If changes are required at the TF level the TF commander can then make an informed decision on what events he will impact.

(TA. 4.4.1 Prepare Plans or Orders)

TREND 38: Automask Criteria. In the TF defensive mission, it is known that the enemy will most likely fire nonpersistent chemicals on where he thinks the TF BPs are as part of Phase 2 fires. However, it is also known the enemy disposition on the battlefield prior to those fires.

RESULTS:
1. The TF can be proactive and automask prior to Phase 2 fires and begin chemical monitoring.
2. Automask criteria is often defined by reactive events such as the sounding of the M8 alarm (which only detects nerve agent vapors) or receiving artillery in the vicinity of template chemical targets.

Techniques:
1. TF conduct a thorough threat assessment during IPB to determine the enemy disposition prior to expected delivery of chemical munitions.
2. Define automask criteria accordingly, for example the FSE crosses PL ALPHA or 26 n/s grid line.

(TA. 4.4.1 Prepare Orders and Plans)

TREND 39: Graphic control measures in brigade schemes of maneuver. Brigade and task force (TF) schemes of maneuver often lack sufficient graphic control measures and detail for coordinating and integrating maneuver to mass firepower.

PROBLEMS:
1. Brigade and TF plans for actions on contact, actions on the objective, and expanding the units battlespace beyond its initial objective are routinely not developed.
2. The planning process often fails to address required graphic control measures for specified tasks (e.g. passage of lines, direct fire control measures, movement routes/axes, air corridors).
3. Control measures for the shift from the deep fight to the close fight are often not well defined.
4. Graphic control measures beyond the objective are often omitted, prohibiting forces to quickly transition.
5. Control measures to protect the force and coordinate the flow of forces from the front to rear are often omitted or done "push -to- talk" during execution.
6. Units designate checkpoints throughout the area of operation, but rarely use them to assist in controlling the force.
7. Brigade SOPs are often not used or are so cumbersome that they play little part in providing the details and control measures required for certain specified tasks in the planning process.
8. Brigade course of action (COA) development and wargaming often stops at the objective; they do little to no "action on the objective" development to assist, or define the fight to ensure the commander's intent is met.
9. The detailed planning required to transition forces or commit follow-on forces through and beyond the objective is not well rehearsed or synchronized.

Techniques:
1. Brigade staffs must address all specified tasks and develop the graphic control measures for each task.
2. Staffs should look at implied tasks and plan the control measures necessary to commit follow-on forces.
3. Control measures should be in sufficient detail to meet the commander's intent. They must provide subordinate commanders the tools necessary to protect the force, transition to the close fight and expand the battlespace through and beyond the objective.
4. During Home Station training, staffs should review doctrinal terms and graphics control measures to gain a clear understanding of their meaning and how they effect each BOS.
5. Units must develop SOPs that facilitate unit actions and be disciplined in using them.

(TA.4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans or Orders)

TREND 40: NBC rehearsals. There is seldom a rehearsal to synchronize the NBC force protection plan.

PROBLEMS:
1. Brigade and Battalion Chemical Officers and the supporting Chemical Company seldom rehearse their scheme of support.
2. Chemical Officers are one of the few staff officers that do not have their own radio in the TOC. Most Chemical Officers can never use a radio during a battle.
3. Chemical Officers at all levels are not included as a briefer during OPORDs and rehearsals.

RESULTS:
1. Chemical Officers have difficulty communicating with other NBC staffs without a radio.
2. Without a briefing from the Chemical Officer, commanders are not informed on key issues that must be communicated such as MOPP level, operational exposure guides (OEG), auto-masking, and concept of support of the NBC slice.

Techniques:
1. Have Chemical Officers and the Chemical Company Commander and Platoons Leaders conduct a FM rehearsal. Just as in any other BOS, a rehearsal is the key to success, not only to talk over the plan but to deconflict any issues.
2. Communication is the key to success during combat operations for Chemical Officers. Give him a radio, even if it is in a vehicle.
3. Have the FM rehearsal on the Chemical Company command frequency.
4. The brigade Chemical Officer should include this rehearsal in his NBC portion of the Brigade TACSOP with a standard agenda and time.
5. Publish this rehearsal time in the brigade timeline along with the maneuver, FS, and CSS rehearsals.
6. Ensure the Chemical Officers are active participants in the presentation of the OPORD and at the rehearsal.

(TA.4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans or Orders)

TREND 41: Military Police (MP) rehearsals. Military Police too often do not conduct effective rehearsals when preparing to execute operations.

PROBLEMS:
1. While MP leaders generally conduct good troop leading procedures, they normally do not understand the different methods available for conducting rehearsals.
2. When confronted with time constraints, MP leaders do not know how to prioritize rehearsal efforts.

RESULT: The lack of effective rehearsals normally leads to poorly executed operations, especially when in contact with enemy forces.

Techniques:
1. Well-resourced and controlled rehearsals are crucial to successful mission accomplishment.
2. Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) Newsletter 91-1, *Rehearsals*, dated April 91, is an excellent guide on rehearsals.
3. Leaders should consider the following rehearsal techniques:
- FM radio rehearsals
- map rehearsals
- sand table/terrain rehearsals
- rock/stick drills (Rock drills are useful in synchronizing movement and immediate action/reaction)
- backbriefs
4. Walk-through and full-speed exercises further increase synchronization.
5. Rehearsals should be done over similar terrain and under similar light/weather conditions as the impending mission.
6. When prioritizing tasks in rehearsals, missions leaders should consider the following:
- actions on the objective
- reaction to enemy contact
- maneuver drills
- movement
- contingencies
- special teams

(TA.4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans or Orders)

TREND 42: Brigade Support Area (BSA) fire and maneuver controls.

PROBLEMS:
1. There is lack of established target reference points and sector stakes.
2. The majority of soldiers cannot tell the difference between an enemy and friendly vehicle. 3. The BSA soldiers have problems with:
- numerous weapon errors
- unauthorized discharges
- having the basic knowledge of the weapon systems they use

RESULT: These problems contribute to the increased risk of fratricide**.**

Techniques:
1. The senior leadership of a battalion should read the following publications:
- FM 101-5, Appendix F and N
- Army Ground and Accident Report Countermeasure, Feb 94
- CALL/NTC Risk Management for Brigades and Battalions, Jun 95
- FM 17-97 Cavalry Troop, Oct 95.
2. FM 17-97 has an example of how risk management and fratricide risk considerations can be incorporated into the five-paragraph OPORD. This is not a change to the OPORD format; rather it should be used during OPORD development to ensure risk management and fratricide reduction measures are included in the order.
3. During orders briefs or when verbal FRAGOs are issued, an immediate confirmation brief should be given to ensure everyone understands what was said.
4. The FSB should enforce force protection standards on the BSA tenants and visitors.
5. Adopt a risk assessment model that includes both safety and tactical hazards.
(TA.4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans or Orders)

TREND 43: BSA save plan rehearsals.

PROBLEM: The BSA leadership often fails to plan rehearsals for the save plan at any level.

RESULT: The save plan is seldom executed, and when it does, it seldom reaches the end state the FSB commander required in saving critical assets.

Techniques:
1. The unit must conduct save plan rehearsals at all levels.
2. Times should be stated in the operations order.
3. The rehearsals should be conducted in the basic form then in the degraded mode, i.e., MOPP Level 4, at night, etc.
4. A more detailed time-distance analysis should be conducted to ensure that the prepare and save triggers allow enough time to clear the BSA prior to the arrival of the enemy.
5. Routes out of the BSA and priority of unit movement to support a hasty displacement also need to be developed in more detail.
6. Site selection for an alternate site must include constant coordination with brigade and ensure the site selected is not in view from the old site.
(TA.4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans or Orders)

TREND 44: Fire Support Officer (FSO) assignment of task and purpose to targets. Fire support officers (FSOs) do not clearly define task and purpose for targets.

PROBLEMS:
1. Task force FSOs usually do not adequately define what the task and purpose is for each task force target.
2. During the wargame, the FSO does not require the S3 to clearly state the intent for each target.

Techniques:
1. Task force FSOs must emphasize the importance of assigning each target a defined task and purpose. If the maneuver commander/S3 cannot provide this, the target is probably not valid and usually not executable.
2. Consider other factors during the planning process, to include:
> - observers
> - artillery we expect available to service a target
> - what maneuver event will trigger the firing of this target

(TA.4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans or Orders)

TREND 45: Coordination of religious support. Brigade level unit ministry teams are not well integrated into the orders process.

PROBLEMS:
1. Chaplains and chaplain assistants are frequently left out of the planning cycle. This is due to an inadequate understanding of the orders process as a continuous cycle that involves the integration of simultaneous staff activities towards focusing of combat power on the decisive point.
2. Chaplains do not effectively integrate religious support input into the warning order/staff estimate/OPORD annex process.
3. Unit Ministry Teams (UMTs) frequently do not brief at maneuver or CSS rehearsal and do not get a religious support annex into the OPORD.

RESULTS:
1. Other staff officers get the impression that the UMT does not care about or share the same understanding of the importance of the orders process.
2. The effect that chaplains and assistants can have on the battlefield is diminished.

Techniques:
1. UMTs must think seriously about how religious support impacts on a given mission. This will focus them as they get involved in the staff estimate process.
2. Dramatically increase the cross-talk between UMTs and S2/S3 sections. If chaplains and assistants are more aggressive in providing input into the estimate process, then the religious support annex will take on an important dimension in the overall OPORD. With religious support included in the OPORD, chaplains and assistants would have something of substance to brief at a CSS rehearsal.
3. It is imperative for both chaplain and chaplain assistant to rehearse their involvement in these processes during train-ups for CTC rotations or other deployments.
4. Plan for the chaplain to attend LTP. If LTP attendance is not possible, chaplains and assistants can review all of the LTP material at Home Station, and gain a comprehensive understanding of the types of missions and religious support challenges they might encounter.

(TA.4.4.1.2 Coordinate Support)

TREND 46: Religious Support coordination with casualty evacuation planners. Brigade Unit Ministry Teams (UMTs) do not fully coordinate with medical casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) planners for coverage of wounded soldiers.

PROBLEM: Often the relationship between the Brigade combat team (BCT) UMT, Forward Support Battalion (FSB) UMT, and CASEVAC planners and are not well defined or developed. These groups are critical in coordinating religious support to wounded soldiers.
      - BCT UMTs do not take the time to fully understand the overall concept for medical support.
      - The FSB chaplain is usually not consulted as the religious support plan for casualties is developed, resulting in a uncoordinated-integrated plan of execution.
      - CASEVAC planners do not appreciate the dimension that UMTs bring when they work with medical assets to bring religious support to casualties.

Techniques:
1. Chaplains and assistants must coordinate, early on, with medical planners to insure everyone fully understands the medical concept of support.
2. UMTs must find ways to integrate into the medical evacuation team so that when UMT members are not around, for instance, they are missed.
3. The BCT UMT should enlist the support of the FSB chaplain. The FSB chaplain has the habitual relationship with the medical assets and can provide the BCT UMT with valuable information on the concepts and personalities that are present in the FSB medical evacuation section.
4. UMTs should be conversant with MEDEVAC doctrine and its employment on the battlefield.

(TA.4.4.1.2 Coordinate Support)

TREND 47: Location of the Brigade Support Area (BSA) commander.

PROBLEMS:
1. Typically, no one in command knows the location of the BSA commander during battle days because that information was lacking in the OPORD.
2. The BSA commander does not understand where the critical logistical points on the battlefield are where his presence is needed.

RESULT: The BSA commander lacks first-hand knowledge of critical problems, which usually leads to failure in meeting his higher intent.

Techniques:
1. If the brigade commander's intent is to have 90% of combat power at LD, a critical point for the BSA commander should be the UMCPs prior to battle. Then the commander may move to the TOC once the brigade commander's intent has been met or update the brigade commander from the action point on why his intent was not met.
2. FSB commanders must map out the critical points prior to conducting the mission:
      - list them by time, phase, or event
      - incorporate the critical points into the order, thus reinforcing to subordinate commanders what is critical to the FSB commander.

(TA.4.4.3 Provide Command Presence)

TREND 48: Understanding NTC Rules of Engagement (ROE). Soldiers do not understand NTC Rules of Engagement (ROE).

PROBLEMS:
1. Leaders do not educate soldiers on NTC Rules of Engagement (ROE).
2. Soldiers do not get briefed on the use of deadly force or even the difference between a mortar signature or an artillery signature or on how to build a grenade IAW the ROE at the NTC.

RESULTS:
1. Soldiers murder innocent civilians causing international incidents.
2. Soldiers go to MOPP Level 4 during a mortar attack when the enemy does not have the capabilities of chemical mortar rounds.

Techniques:
1. Pertinent training events at Home Station should use the NTC ROE. This will improve the knowledge of the ROE at lower levels and improve the productivity of the unit to speed up reconstituting efforts.
 2. Given today's increased likelihood of deploying with little or no notice, commanders must be able to educate soldiers on the various types of ROE they may encounter from peacetime, use of deadly force, and wartime.

(TA.4.4.4 Maintain Unit Discipline)

TREND 49: Convoy actions at the halt.

PROBLEMS:
1. Drivers in Main Support Battalion (MSB) convoys are not disciplined in their actions when a convoy halts en route or at its destination.
2. Convoy commanders do not set consistent standards; not all vehicle drivers get out and take up defensive positions.

Technique: Units must establish standards, incorporate them into training plans and SOPs, and practice them at Home Station.

(TA.4.4.4 Maintain Unit Discipline)

TREND 50: Control of Brigade Support Area (BSA) traffic flow.

PROBLEM: BSAs do not use wire to control the traffic flow in and out of the BSA.

RESULTS:
1. Soldiers wander the BSA looking for their point of contact for the classes of supply.
2. The soldiers drive through all areas, i.e., sleeping areas, mess halls, and command posts.
3. The constant driving towards the BSA on any trail makes it difficult for OPs to decipher between friendly and enemy, causing the OPs to become apathetic because everyone is coming from all different directions.

Technique: To control traffic in the BSA, The Forward Support Battalion (FSB) should practice setting up wire IAW the BSA defense plan and traffic control plan, then execute the plans during field training exercises. To do this, the BSA must review its load plans to ensure that each vehicle within the BSA carries needed obstacle material, especially wire and pickets, 55-gallon drums, dragons teeth, etc.

(TA.4.4.4 Maintain Unit Discipline)

TREND 51: Company fire support team Pre Combat Checks (PCCs) and Pre Combat Inspections (PCIs). Company fire support teams (FISTs) generally conduct inadequate PCCs/PCIs.

PROBLEMS:
1. Ground/Vehicle Laser Locator Designators (G/VLLD) batteries fail when dismounted.
2. Protective masks do not seal during a chemical attack.
3. M-60 machine guns do not fire because they are dirty.
4. Radios will not hold a crypto fill.
5. Cables are missing.

Techniques:
1. Develop detailed PCC/PCI checklists prior to execution.
2. Make checklists mission specific, e.g.:
   - dismounted operations
   - copperhead shoots
   - offensive operations, etc.

(TA.4.4.4 Maintain Unit Discipline)

TREND 52: Synchronization of ADA with Brigade Combat Team tactical operations. ADA Battery Commanders/LNOs are well integrated into BCT staff planning process. They are aware of their staff responsibilities in the planning process and are *proactive* in their integration and synchronization with the staff. Air defenders normally work closely with the staff S2s as they jointly develop the aerial dimension to the IPB and the are active participants during COA development and Wargaming.

Technique: Continue participating in staff order drills during Home Station training.

(TA.4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations)

TREND 53: Synchronization of mechanized, artillery and potted smoke. Units develop smoke plans to obscure breach sites without synchronizing the different types of smoke.

PROBLEMS:
1. The brigade chemical officer will work with the chemical company commander and smoke platoon leader and come up with a plan; the FSO will have a different plan, and rarely are smoke pots utilized.
2. No key person is identified to plan and achieve visibility criteria that is key to the commander's intent.
3. Field Artillery units often run out of smoke at the critical point in the breach operations. 4. There is no deliberate plan to tie in with the other types of smoke to increase smoke platoon survivability.
5. The brigade's allotment of smoke pots is usually left in the BSA or with a unit that will have nothing to do with the breaching operation.
6. For those units that do utilize smoke pots, the smoke pot guide is not used to determine numbers and spacing of pots to achieve the commander's intent.

RESULTS:
1. The breach is rarely obscured to the extent that it meets the commander's intent.
2. Smoke platoons that are sent too close to the breach and in direct fire range are often destroyed.

Techniques:
1. Make the Brigade Chemical Officer the sole proponent for smoke. Chemical Officers that have been smoke platoon leaders know more about smoke and those weather conditions that affect smoke more than anyone.
2. Establish a targeting cell that includes the Chemical Officer, FSO, Engineer, and S2 to come up with a synchronized smoke plan.
3. The Chemical Officer must develop a smoke annex to the brigade order and brief the plan.
4. Designate a single smoke control officer that adjusts both mechanized and artillery smoke. This control officer will have direct communications with the brigade chemical officer and FSO.
5. The smoke plan should be included in the brigade maneuver and FS rehearsals, with the chemical officer still the critical link.

(TA.4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations)

TREND 54: Integration of combat service support operations.

PROBLEMS:
1. Combat service support and the other BOSs are normally not integrated during planning. This is especially evident for separate company/platoon operations, specifically MP, air defense, chemical, and signal units.
2. The brigade S1, S4, and Forward Support Battalion (FSB) security, plans and operations (SPO) officers are minimally involved in the planning process. Most units have a logistics cell at the main CP for the purpose of planning and current operations interface. This provides the logistics community with a full-time representative; however, units generally take for granted the experience level of the representatives and do not provide supervision.

RESULT:
1. Remote stations (such as check point personnel or RETRANS sites) do not have a concept of support; especially casualty evacuation (CASEVAC)
2. Remote stations do not contribute to the brigade rear area (such as early warning from the checkpoints or air defense positions).
3. Planning considerations are often overlooked, and estimates used for concept development are flawed.
4. Normally, after issue of the brigade OPORD, the S4 and SPO must take the first draft CSS annex that was included in the order, and rewrite it into a viable CSS annex.

Techniques:
1. The S4 must supervise.
2. Integrate the S4 during the planning process.

RESULTS:
1. As the CSS cell at the main CP gains experience, the concept of support (as developed by the planners) will improve.
2. Integration of the S4 will hasten the exchange of data between the rear and main CPs resulting in an ability for anticipation by the BSA.
3. The S4 will review the annex in the OPORD at the time of issue, ensuring attainability of tasks in the CSS annex.

(TA.4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations)

TREND 55: Breach Tenets in Mission Analysis and Course of Action Development.

PROBLEMS:
1. The TF commander must ensure synchronization through proper planning and force preparation.
2. Misunderstanding and application of the "breach tenets" at the TF level. The breach tenets (intel, breaching fundamentals, breaching organization, mass and synchronization) are overlooked during mission analysis and COA development.
3. Generally units do not reverse plan actions on the objective there is no specified, clearly defined end state of what the TF should look like on the objective.

RESULTS:
1. The Task Force failed to synchronize breaching operations as part of the overall scheme of maneuver.
2. Recent trends Actions on the objective determine the point of penetration and the size/type of the assault force. The location of the point of penetration and the size/type of the assault force then determines the point of breach, number of lanes required and the size/type of security force (near and far side).
3. The ability of the enemy's infantry to interfere with the breach determines whether the breaching site is to be secured by fires or by force. Lane requirements and the type of obstacle then drive the allocation of mobility assets.
4. The enemy's fires at the obstacle determines the amount of suppression/size of the support force.

Techniques:
1. The commander's intent merits special consideration during breach planning.
2. Reverse planning drives the maneuver formation to ensure that forces are in the correct relative positions to accomplish their breaching roles and actions on the objective.
3. The keys are detailed reverse planning, clear sub-unit instructions, effective command and control and a well-rehearsed force.
4. The most effective tool available to the commander is the rehearsal. TF rehearsals focus on synchronizing the maneuver of support, breach, and assault forces to achieve the SOSR (suppress, obscure, secure and reduce) breaching fundamentals and highlight key events that must be coordinated during breach execution.
5. The TF main effort must be clear and must be supported by the SOEO (scheme of engineer operations).
6. The engineer must understand the scheme of maneuver and must plan to shift engineer forces and equipment consistent with the commander's main effort. This shifting of forces is critical in successive breach operations. The engineer planner ensures that the SOEO serves as a combat multiplier and not just a force provider.

(TA. 4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations)

TREND 56: Synchronization of refueling operations in the brigade support area (BSA).
Main Support Battalion (MSB) tankers habitually stay 12-24 hours on station in the BSA during refueling operations.

PROBLEMS:
1. MSB tankers normally move to conduct refuel operations in the BSA shortly after dusk. Because of poor synchronization, the tankers often wait on station for 4-6 hours (until early the next morning) for the Forward Support Battalion (FSB) to finish refueling the maneuver units.
2. If some of the tankers are not used, they are retained another 12 hours or more in the BSA until the FSB requires more bulk fuel.

Technique: A reasonable time for the tankers to remain on station in the BSA is 2-4 hours. Both MSB and FSB support operations officers (SPOs) must synchronize refueling operations with combat and refueling operations of maneuver units to ensure that tankers are in and out of the BSA within this reasonable timeframe. *(TA.4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations)*

National Training Center (NTC)
TRENDS
1st & 2d Qtrs, FY 97

The Secretary of the Army has determined that the publication of this periodical is necessary in the transaction of the public business as required by law of the Department. Use of funds for printing this publication has been approved by Commander, U. S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1985, IAW AR 25-30.

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